

The Mongol Mamluk Sultan Al Adel Kitbugha (694-702 Hij, 1294-1302 AD)

Soud Mohammad Al Asfour

Department of History, Kuwait University, Kuwait

Abstract: In history, some personalities stand out due to the differences in the way they were viewed after achieving glory for themselves, a glory that took them up to the highest ranks. Among those was the Sultan Al Adel Kitbugha around whom historians have differed in their assessment of his eligibility to rule Egypt and the Levant. Many historians of the Mamluk era praised him, such as Abu Shama Al Maqdasi, Ibn Kathir, Ibn Al Jazri, Ibn Ayas, among others. However, other historians vilified him and accused him of favoring members of his own Mongol race. These historians include Ibn Al Furat, Baibars Al Mansuri, Al Hasan Al Safdi, among others. The main contention of this research devolves around a detailed analysis of these conflicting views and a profile of the unusual personality of the Mongol Sultan Al Adel Kitbugha, who, despite accusations of favoring members of his own race, successfully ruled Egypt and the Levant amidst heated differences between those who praised and those who reviled him. *Research Plan:* The research plan depends upon historic reports of events in understanding aspects of such an important and controversial personality in the Mamluk era. To fulfil this objective, we need a thorough analysis of the collected data to reveal the facts. The research will deal with his Mongol origin, the great trust that Sultan Al Mansur Qalawun and his son Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad placed in him, his Sultanate, historians' conflicting views of him, his relation to members of his own Mongol race, his removal from the Sultanate and the subsequent accession of Sultan Al Mansur Lajin, then his appointment to rule Hama and later his demise.

Key words: Mongol • Mamluk • Al Adel Kitbugha • Al Mansur Qalawun • Al Nasir Mohammad bin Qalawun

INTRODUCTION

First: His Mongol Origin and the Trust That Sultan Al Mansur Qalawun and His Son Al Nasir Mohammad Had in Him: He was known as Kitbugha Ibn Abdullah Al Mansuri, a Turk of Mongol origin from the Oirats [1], a sect of Tatars who was captured as a prisoner of war after the first battle of Hums (659 Hij, 1260 AD), which took place during the reign of Al Zhaher Baibars after the decisive battle of Ain Jalut between the Mamluks and the Mongols [2].

By his ancestry, Kitbugha was a Mamluk of Sultan Al Mansur Qalawun, father of Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad. He was taken by the former, educated and set free. Kitbugha became a Mamluk of the Sultanate, an elite regiment known for their military prowess and ready to engage in war. Kitbugha soon became a Khaskia [3] (a Mamluk raised from a young age). He was promoted to the high-ranking post of Emir Asharah (Prince of Ten [4]), then prince of Tablakhanah [5] and later to Muqaddim Uluf (Commander of Thousands [6]). Therefore, he was

loyal to his master Al Mansur Qalawun [7] and it is only logical that he should be equally loyal to his master's son Al Nasir Mohammad and became one of his most favored Mamluks. Not only did he win Al Nasir Mohammad's trust, but also regarded him with respect and veneration. Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad exaggerated in honoring him believing he was the honest guardian of his Sultanate. He appointed him as Atabeg [8] of his army, a military position right below that of the Sultan himself. Al Qashqashandi mentioned that whoever took up this position must be 'Abul Umaraa' (literally father of princes) and must be the most senior prince, second to none but the sponsoring deputy and therefore must be high in office and status. This position brought him closer to the Sultan and enabled him to control the army, which was the means to manage the State or change policies if needed.

Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad ibn Qalawun's first term was his formal initiation into politics as he was only 9 years old when he was proclaimed Sultan on Muharram 8, 693 Hij/December 1293 AD. Kitbugha's greatest

opportunity came with the murder of Al Ashraf Khalil and the accession of his brother Mohammad who appointed Kitbugha as deputy of the Sultanate to replace Prince Baidara. Hence, he had in his grip all matters of state [9].

By his high position, Prince Kitbugha assumed control over all state matters. He greatly helped Al Nasir Mohammad ibn Qalawun to consolidate his dominion and get rid of all his opponents who were responsible for the murder of King Al Ashraf Khalil. Among those was Qafjaq Al Selhidar [10] and prince Kurdi Al Saq [11] who were arrested and imprisoned in the Citadel under the custody of Prince Baibars Al Jashinkir [12] who was responsible for their punishment. He forced them to confess their treason and conspiracy with other princes and were sentenced to death. However, some refused to confess [13]. Kitbugha ordered that conspirators against the state should get their arms and legs cut off and be tied [14] to camel backs and paraded in the streets of Cairo for their treason [15] and be a lesson to others. Torch bearers [16] kept calling 'this is the just fate for those who kill their masters'. He later killed them by burying them to their waist [17] in the sand near the horse market [18].

Kitbugha was firm with his opponents. He did not only put princes to death, but also arrested some Mamluks of the Sultanate and imprisoned them in the Shamayel [19] prison, where inmates were savagely tortured and never left it healthy and alive [20]. By Kitbugha's order, Prince Sinjir Al Shuja'i Ali arrested Al Sahib [21] Shams El Din bin Al Sal'us the minister, confiscated his wealth, confined his relatives, children and followers to prison and tortured him daily by putting his ankles in the press [22] and was beaten to death on a Sunday in Safar, 693 Hij, January 1294 [23].

Prince Kitbugha went to extremes to protect the Sultanate of his master Al Nasir Mohammad, especially as Mamluks resisted all attempts to subject them to the Mamluk State. Prince Sinjir Al Shuja'i, despite being a devoted follower of Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad bin Qalawun and subject to orders from his deputy Prince Kitbugha, had his own ambitions and didn't take Sultan Al Nasir seriously for his young age. Moreover, he incited rebellion by the Sultan's opponents when Al Nasir was finally proclaimed ruler. Prince Sinjir thought of turning against the Sultan and reign instead after deposing him [24].

It was clear that Prince Sinjir tried hard to weaken Kitbugha's grip over power by kindling intrigues between Kitbugha and other princes and bribed some, especially the Citadel Mamluks [25], to create mischief. To achieve this goal, it is estimated that he spent 80 thousand Dinars,

plus his land and Barak [26] (clothes and valuable possessions) and his house. These conspiracies led to serious differences among the military with the consequence that they split in their allegiance to Prince Kitbugha, the Sultanate Deputy and Prince Sinjir Al Shuja'i the Minister [27].

The day arrived when the Citadel Mamluks rose against Prince Kitbugha. It was on Friday, Rajab 23rd, 693 Hij., May 1294, when Citadel Mamluks besieged princes' homes. Prince Kitbugha, supported by Al Khishdashis [28] marched to the horse market, besieged the Citadel and cut off water supply. The Citadel Mamluks went out to fight them and were about to defeat Prince Kitbugha and his followers. The situation then changed in Kitbugha's favor with the arrival of Prince Bisri, Prince Piktash and his armed forces, Baktut Al Alaa'i, Aybak Al Mosuli, Aqsanqar, Bilban Al Hasni and other princes of tents [29]. Moreover, the Sultanate Mamluks [30] who were there joined the fight against the rebels [31].

Fight erupted and the Citadel Mamluks were soon crushed and defeated. There were about 4700 Mamluks who lived in the Citadel. When Prince Sinjir saw an imminent defeat, he negotiated his own safety while the Citadel Mamluks withdrew and surrendered to Kitbugha.

After Kitbugha's victory, he refused to grant Sinjir personal safety [32]. The latter was stubborn and adamant in his rebellion and declined the Aleppo Emirate as a consolation for his greedy ambitions to become the Sultan. In the end, he was put to death by Al Ashrafia Mamluks [33]. They decapitated him, wrapped his head in a silk towel and sent it to Kitbugha. When the Citadel Mamluks saw their master's severed head, they feared a similar fate and stopped their rebellion. Kitbugha ordered them to quit the Citadel and take lodgings in the towers of Cairo walls behind Al Barqia [34] gate. They gave in and obeyed his orders. Kitbugha provided them with food and necessities, on condition they should never leave their posts or ride their horses with their weapons [35].

To put a definitive end to Prince Sinjir Al Shuja'i's rebellion, Kitbugha arrested his followers Al Ustadar [36], Prince Baibars Jashinkir [37], Emir Akhor Kabir [38], Al Luqmani and others. They were chained and imprisoned in Alexandria, while others were set free to appease the unrest and restore peace and security. Among those were Prince Kafjaq Al Silhidar, Prince Abdullah the Crown Bearer [39], Prince Kurdi the waiter and Prince Omar Shah Al Silhidar. They were brought to him, pardoned and generously rewarded and returned to their jobs [40].

The rebellion against Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad bin Qalawun was not only that of the Tower Mamluks. On Muharram 10, 694 Hij., November 1294, Some of Al Ashrafiya Mamluks, with nightfall, moved against the Sultan. They opened Al Sa'aada Gate [41], raided people's stables and stole their horses. Kitbugha arrested them, cut off their hands and paraded them in the streets of Cairo. He later crucified them at Bab Zweilah [42] (Zweilah Gate). They were about 300 Mamluks in number [43].

Such was Prince Kitbugha's loyalty to Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad bin Qalawun, just as it was to his father. Kitbugha helped them consolidate their rule, got rid of their adversaries and supported them in hard times. It was no wonder they both loved and trusted him, brought him closer to their circles, assigned him many official state tasks and finally appointed him as deputy of the Sultanate.

Second: His Sultanate and the Historians' Contradictory Views of His Character: Despite Prince Kitbugha's loyalty to Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad bin Qalawun and his father, his lust for power was irresistible. Since Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad was young and of poor health, Kitbugha removed him. In this respect, Ibn Al Mughayzil wrote, 'This year, 694 Hij., 1294 AD and in the month of Muharram, Princes of Egypt decided to appoint Al Adel Zein El Din Kitbugha as Sultan of the land on grounds of his integrity, his good management of State matters and fairness, to replace the young and ailing king Al Nasir Mohammad. Conditions of the state continued at their best [44].

The words of the historian Ibn Al Mughayzil clearly indicate that he was in favor of removing King Al Nasir Mohammad. It was impossible to maintain a stable rule of Egypt with a young, helpless and ailing king in office. Senior princes led by Prince Al Adel Kitbugha decided to remove him and take office.

Historians agreed on the year Prince Kitbugha assumed power, but differed as to the day and month he became the Sultan. Some say he officially became Sultan of Egypt on Thursday Muharram 12, 694 Hij. November 1294 AD. He was 40 years old according to historians Al Zahabi and Ibn Ayas [45]. Others like Baibars Al Mansuri [46] claim he ascended the throne on Muharram 9, while historian Al Birzali claimed it was on Wednesday Rabie Al Awal 1st [47]. Ibn Al Jazri was probably the most accurate historian in stating that, 'it was Muharram 11, between noon and afternoon that Prince Kitbugha, deputy of the Sultanate, ascended the throne, in the Mount Citadel [48], as Sultan of Egypt' [49].

Moreover, historians also varied widely in their assessment of his personality. Some praised him while others reviled him equally strongly. It's useful to survey some of these differences to come as close as possible to the truth about his character.

Ibn Al Jazri praised his policies and mentioned that people rejoiced at the change, while people of the Levant felt optimistic about his Sultanate. Drought had prevailed there until the 17th of Muharram, but it came pouring in for days when he ascended the throne. Sheikh Sharaf El Din bin Al Maqdisi gave a speech in which he stressed the blessings of the event, 'The Moslems united under the rule of Sultan Al Adel Kitbugha and rain came pouring in' [50].

Ibn Al Jazri elsewhere, in an exaggerated praise of Al Adel Kitbugha, described people's happiness with his Sultanate, 'Sultan Al Adel Zein El Din Kitbugha rode his horse in a majestic royal procession from the Citadel to Bab El Nasr [51] (victory gate), right through the streets of Cairo and between the two palaces (Bein Al Qasrein) [52] ... with people rejoicing and shouting prayers for him' [53].

Among the historians who praised him was Ibn Shakir Al Kutbi who wrote, 'He was known for his religiosity, generosity and kindness to his subjects. His reign witnessed huge price rise in Egypt. He wept because of the hardships people faced and used to say 'it's because of my sins that this happened.' Ibn Shakir mentioned what Al Wadi'i had said when Al Adel became Sultan and lavishly poured gifts on the people of Damascus:

Al Adel was the Sultan of all people when he generously honored all,

Just like sweet nectar that imbues all spring roses [54].

Ibn Shakir the historian, who lived during the period of price increase, testifies to Sultan Al Adel Kitbugha's efforts to combat inflation by sacrificing his own money to alleviate people's hardships. His wise instructions helped much in dealing with this economic crisis.

Moreover, Ibn Ayas, quoting Abi Shama's historic narration, 'emphasized Kitbugha's sacrifice of his own money to fight inflation. He paid out of his own money for the burial expenses of strangers who died in the streets, more than 270, 000 people in all' [55], Those were the victims of the plague in 695 Hij, 1295 AD, when many people lost their lives and, 'the streets and alleys were filled with rotting corpses and people used to fall dead off the backs of their donkeys.' [56].

In the words of Ibn Al Emad Al Hanbali, 'He was short, dark-skinned and with a clear voice. He was also brave, modest, religious with a clear conscience and had a short neck.' [57] Undoubtedly, brave people often act arrogantly, but to be brave and modest meant an added virtue.

Justice is the foundation of rule, generosity is a clear asset, religion guarantees good conduct. These were all present in Ibn Kathir's praise of Sultan Al Adel Kitbugha when he wrote, 'The man who became the Sultan of Egypt, meaning Al Adel Kitbugha, was one of the elite princes who had a good reputation in supporting Islam' [58]. What Ibn Kathir had to say about Al Adel Kitbugha indicated his fairness to his subjects and embodied the true principles of Islam.

Among the proofs that people used to highlight Al Adel Kitbugha's fairness to his subjects was what he did when he marched to Damascus on Wednesday Muharram 2nd, 696 Hij., October 1296 and after Friday prayers in the royal compartment, he visited Prophet Hud's tomb (PUH) where he prayed again and was personally handed people's petitions and complaints. He even walked to one individual and took his petition to comfort him. On the following Saturday, he sat in the Justice Palace and reviewed and signed these petitions, together with his Justice Minister Fakhr El Din Al Khalili [59].

Furthermore, to prove to his subjects he cares about them, he used to give generously to the poor and needy. On Muharram 11th after Friday prayers, he went back to Prophet Hud's tomb where he prayed again before heading to Mahgaret El Damm [60], (literally cave of blood), where he gave out money generously [61] to the poor and people in need [62].

Other signs of piety that people saw include his sitting after dinner at Al Kamilia Window [63] on Muharram 13th of the same year (696 Hij., 1296 AD), together with his minister Khalili when the Quran was recited. Subsequently, he ordered that the Amawi Mosque be carpeted at his own expense [64].

At the beginning of Safar of the year 696 Hij., November 1296 AD, he dropped the taxes and abolished the fines that Damascenes and people elsewhere owed [65].

Ibn Taghribirdi the historian praised him and reiterated how Damascenes loved him and were appreciative of his character and deeds.⁽⁶⁶⁾ In another place, he wrote, 'He was a generous and religious king, reasonable and fair, brave but modest and appreciated and gave much to religious men [67].

Al Birzali praised him when he wrote, 'He was a good and a religious man' [68].

Ibn Ayas also wrote, 'He was known to be brave, religious and generous, who rarely hurt people and had a clear conscience' [69].

Baibars Al Mansuri was among the historians who vilified Kitbugha. He wrote about his Sultanate, 'His accession was an ominous sign, people were stricken with poverty and their luck changed to the worse. They weren't happy at all. He was so backward in his deeds when he overshadowed the legitimate Sultan and prevented him from performing his duties. He raised his Mamluks, especially Ustaz Dar and Baktut Al Azraq, who were given the greatest lands and soon spread their authority in the state. They were both harsh and unjust to the masses. They arrested and imprisoned people and swayed away from the right path' [70].

It was clear from the words of Baibars Al Mansuri that he was close enough to both Kitbugha and Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad to see how the former betrayed his master and incited his Mamluks against him. He bribed them with lands and appointed the least trustworthy to perform state duties.

About the dire economic situation, the low flood and the plague that coincided with Kitbugha's accession, Baibars Al Mansuri wrote, 'Distraught and depressed at his accession, people said he was bad omen. With his treacherous face, calamities befell the masses. Prices increased and so did the cost of living, with the consequence that corruption became widespread and people complained of the lack of water for irrigation. They suffered from a fatal plague that caused innumerable number of deaths.' [71].

In another quote, he spoke of people's rejection of his rule. He wrote, 'People were disgusted by him and abhorred his reign.' [72].

In connection with how princes hated him, his Mamluks and miserliness, he wrote, 'Some princes who united in hatred for his Mamluks, his entourage and apparent miserliness, decided to remove him.' [73] He also mentioned his despicably shameful escape when Mamluks rose up against him intending to remove him, 'He became a fugitive and his followers forsook him. People were reluctant to kick him out. If they had him arrested, they would have killed him with God's will.' [74].

In another statement, Baibars Al Mansuri sarcastically wrote, 'When that Zein El Din Kitbugha arrived in Damascus, he tried to win local princes' approval, but all he found was aversion from them all.' [75].

Any researcher investigating Baibars Al Mansuri's statement cannot take them all seriously as facts for many reasons. One of these reasons was Baibars' closeness

and loyalty to his master Sultan Al Mansur Qalawun and afterwards to his son Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad. During their reign, he was both trusted and appointed for many important posts and entrusted with various official duties. For example, he was appointed deputy of Al Karak, the Dawadar [76] (literally ink-bearer), deputy for the Citadel in Cairo [77], Crown Bearer in the Sultan's processions, deputy for Justice [78], Custodian of Waqf [79] in Mansuria and Shamiya, then was appointed to the highest position in the State as deputy of the Sultanate [80]. When Al Adel Kitbugha became the Sultan, Baibars Al Mansuri lost all these privileges, status and posts. It was not surprising to see him go to extremes in reviling Sultan Kitbugha and didn't see any virtue in him at all. This was apparent in all his derogative statements about Kitbugha.

Al Maqrizi was one of Kitbugha's critics, even on the day of his accession to the throne. He also mentioned that palace staff were grumbling at the event. Quoting an incident in this respect, he wrote, 'A strange incidence occurred when the Sultan kitchen supervisor at the Citadel beat up some Marqadriya [81]) (cooks) at the start of the new Sultan's procession. All cooks including the punished ones rushed to the window to watch the procession. The beaten cook shouted, 'what an ominous day'. The words soon spread and became a catchphrase [82] Al Maqrizi then highlighted how Kitbugha's accession to the throne was not only catastrophic to the palace staff, but to all people.

Ibn Al Furat was another historian who reviled Kitbugha. Referring to the bad conditions that spread throughout the Sultanate, he wrote, 'His was a miserable Sultanate and all people had a hard time coping with lasting hardships in Egypt, the Levant and Al Hijaz' [83].

Ibn Al Furat also stressed Kitbugha's disloyalty to his master Sultan Al Nasir and his maltreatment of the Sultan's mother. He wrote, 'When Kitbugha became Sultan, he confined Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad bin Qalawun and his mother to a few rooms within the Citadel and treated them inappropriately' [84].

Historian Ibn Taghribirdi was surprised by how Mamluk princes didn't think highly of Prince Kitbugha and weren't that keen on his return to power when he was ousted. He wrote, 'Stranger than this, when Al Mansur Lajin was killed, the princes didn't know who would replace him. Kitbugha's name was never mentioned or suggested as a likely replacement. They finally recalled King Al Nasir Mohammad bin Qalawun from Al Karak and made him Sultan' [85].

He contemptuously indicated his lack of stamina to defend his rights in the Sultanate and his despicable surrender to fate. 'Hearts turned away from him when

people saw his lack of stamina and shameful surrender to his fate without a fight. He could have defended with all his might what seemed to be his right, even at the cost of his life and he would have died in honor' [86].

Al Hasan Al Safdi didn't speak well either of Kitbugha's revenge of the Sultanate Mamluks. He wrote, 'He (Kitbugha) arrested the Burjis (Tower Mamluks), jailed them in Damietta and Alexandria, killed a number of Khaskia Mamluks [87] and others at the Citadel's gate, disbanded the Sultanate Mamluks and sent them to the Walis (local rulers) in the Levant and Egypt.' [88].

With these contradictory views of Sultan Kitbugha, one can only see exaggeration in both camps. To reach the truth, one must consult other historians who are known to be objective and unbiased. In my belief, the historian Al Zahabi was such an authority. He prudently wrote about Al Adel Kitbugha, 'He was known for valor, religiosity and good intentions, but he lacked stamina and firmness' [89].

Al Zahabi's knowledgeable view stands to reason; good intentions and valor do not always guarantee rightful and well-guided view. It may be that his close allies didn't give him advice to help him reach decisions to appropriately act upon. The historian Ibn Duqmaq agreed with Al Zahabi's view of Al Adel Kitbugha when he wrote, 'He was known to be brave, religious and meant well, but lacked good reason and firmness' [90].

The current researcher believes that Kitbugha's character, with all its contradictions and how historians differed about him, is a rare one in history. After being a fearful Sultan, he was humiliated and became content with a much lower and secure status. Ibn Taghribirdi wrote on this matter, 'Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad bin Qalawun, in his second term as Sultan, transferred him from Sarkhad to Hama and made him just another deputy of the Sultanate, who received orders and gave none. He was ordered to fight with the Tajrid [91] (anti-piracy squad), be in service for deputies in the Levant and also joined Jihadists.' [92]. In another statement, he said, 'Kitbugha's case was exceptionally strange and unprecedented. He was the Sultan of Egypt for more than two years, in which he became the most authoritative and feared figure and was supported by Mamluks and followers, then was stripped of all that to become just another deputy in the Levant. Such a thing never happened to any other Mamluk before' [93].

Third: Al Adel Kitbugha's Relation to Members of His Own Mongol Race: Kitbugha's racist fanaticism is one of the concerns of this research. It was mentioned in some sources that he favored and was biased to members of his

own Mongol race. The proof was in the arrival of some Oiratsand Tatars upon his accession to the throne. He was then 40 or 50 years old. They arrived after a long trip through the Levant, were welcomed by the army, then travelled to Egypt in honor accompanied by Prince Qara Sunqor Al Mansuri [94].

Ibn Kathir's definitive statement on the matter indicated that this warm welcome by the army came as a direct order from Sultan Kitbugha himself. He wrote, 'Being one of them' [95]. This was a clear statement of his bias towards members of his own race who had the right to come and receive such a welcome.

Ibn Kathir's view on this matter didn't differ much from those of other historians. People of Egypt and the Levant knew for sure that Kitbugha was proud of his Mongol origin and clearly favored members of his own race. He should have had more discretion not to show that clearly. Being the Sultan of all people, he should have ignored his origin. Some historians, such as Ibn Al Furat, went as far as suggesting that this incident was one of the direct reasons for his deposition [96].

Given the context of current events, we believe this was an exaggeration. The incident of this warm welcome had no direct impact on his decisions as Sultan. Kitbugha was not known to have appointed deputies and otherwise on grounds of their Mongol origin, or helped his Mongol people in war against others, including Moslems.

There was another incident in history that historians used to claim he favored members of his own race. It is conducive to the objective of the current research to refer to this incident in detail and thoroughly analyze it to reach reliable conclusions. In the month of Safar 694 Hij., December 1294 AD, the year of the great inflation, the news came of the arrival of many combatants of King Baidu with their families, 10, 000 according to Ibn Taghribirdi and 18, 000 according to Ibn Al Furat, who wished to convert to Islam in fear of Sultan Ghazan. They were headed by their Emir Turghai, son-in-law to Hulagu and Kaktai. Sultan Al Adel Kitbugha showed concern for their plight and asked the Prince of Damascus, Alam El Din Sinjir Al Dawadari to go and welcome them. He did that on Rabei Al Awal 1st, then was followed by Prince Shams El Din Sunqor Al A'sar and the Divan singer in the Levant. Moreover, Al Adel Kitbugha asked Prince Shams El Din Qara Sunqor Al Mansuri to leave Cairo and go to welcome them and to bring back with them some of their notable members. Sunqor arrived in Damascus on the 22nd of Rabie Al Awal, followed by Prince Seif Al Din Bahader Al Haj of Aleppo. They remained in Damascus until the arrival of the Oirat notables accompanied by Prince Shams El Din Sunqor Al A'sar on the 23rd of Rabie

Al Awal of the same year. These numbered 113 of their most notable knights, headed by Turghai and the two elders Alus and Kakbei. People rejoiced at their arrival and conversion to Islam. Kitbugha went to extremes in lavishly splashing them with presents and gave them residence in Al Ablaq palace [97] near the square. Furthermore, he ordered Al Tablakhanah [98] (drummers and musicians) to give them a warm welcome. Prince Alam Al Din Sinjir remained with the rest, who numbered more than 10, 000 old men, women and children with their cattle and huge rakht [99] (embroidered dress, household stuff and furniture). Qara Sinjir stayed with them for a few days before heading for Egypt. They arrived in Cairo at the end of Rabie Al Akher, where Sultan Kitbugha generously arranged for them monthly allowances [100].

Prince Badr El Din Bektash Al Fakheri stated that the arrival of the Oirats was on Wednesday 2nd of Jumadi Al Awal, 695 Hij., March 1295 AD and on Monday Ramadan 6th of the same year another batch of Oirats arrived [101].

Ibn Habib in his well-informed memos wrote, 'They were honored with royal presents and were granted lands to settle in' [102].

Ibn Al Jazri in his work *Tarikh Hawadeth Al Zaman*(History of events in time) wrote, 'They arranged for them generous allowances and were greatly honored' and exaggeration is clearly obvious here [103].

Ibn Hajar Al Asqalani in his *Al Dorar Al Kaminah* (The hidden gems) wrote, 'I saw in Al Tajibi's trip that the Al Mansur Lajin's letter arrived in Alexandria when his Sultanate was stable and in it, the reason they rose against Kitbugha was his bias towards members of his own race. The princes realized this and wanted him killed, but he managed to escape with thirty of his closest followers. [104].

In his historic account, Ibn Al Furat was critical of Kitbugha for doing this and his exaggerated generosity to the Oirats. He wrote, 'They were infidels and used to eat in Ramadan. They slaughtered horses not according to Sharia, but by tying them up and hitting them on the head until they died and ate them. We are to Allah and to Him we return.' Then wrote, 'Those blasphemous people used to sit with princes at the Citadel's gate on procession days. The princes were disgusted and furious at their presence. They were mad at Kitbugha and finally dethroned him, as we will mention later, by God's will and by Allah, they did the right thing' [105].

Baibars Al Mansuri, in his book *Al Tuhfa Al Mullukia* (The Royal masterpiece) clearly indicated Kitbugha's bias to members of his own race. He wrote, 'Kitbugha wholeheartedly welcomed them and was very generous in honoring them with Inzal [106] (presents to

guests) and granted them residences. He ordered that their elders be welcomed with Tablakhanah before they were converted to Islam and getting trained in rightful royal manners. They sat at the Qillah gate [107] just like princes did. They were as many as the Tatars and as rough savages as all infidels. They didn't know how to behave politely and appropriately. This hurt all, young and old and Kitbugha's Mamluks condemned him for doing this and took matters in their own hands. They hated him and were disgusted by these matters. This was coupled with ordinary people's suffering and pessimism whenever they saw his face. They lamented the reign of Al Nasir whose royalty was a sight to behold' [108].

As for the rest of the Oirats, Kitbugha wrote to Prince Alam El Din Sinjir Al Dawadari to accompany them to the coast in the land of Athlith [109]. As they passed by Damascus, he let them camp in the meadows and no one was allowed into the city. He ordered vendors to go out for them for trade between the meadows and the two villages of Al Kiswaa [110] and Al Sanamain [111]. Prince Alam El Din Sinjir Al Dawadari did the same wherever they stopped until they reached the land of Athlith where they spread along the coast. Kitbugha ordered prince Alam El Din Sinjir to remain with them until his (Kitbugha's) arrival in the Levant [112].

Many of them died and their boys were taken as servants by princes. As their women were beautiful, they were taken as wives by fighters, while men became soldiers. They spread out in many Moslem kingdoms, became themselves Moslems, while some continued as servants [113].

An historical critique of the incident:

- Most of the Mongols who arrived were Oirats, just like Kitbugha himself. Hence, it was only natural that he should be biased to them.
- The number of Mongols who arrived in the Levant ranged between 10-18 thousand. This proves they were certain of a warm welcome by their supportive host, especially as he was the Sultan of Egypt and the Levant and a member of their own race.
- They had escaped from their former Mongol master Al Khan Ghazan, who, as they knew only too well, was at odds with the Moslem Sultan Al Adel Kitbugha. Thus, they were confident the latter would welcome them.
- The arriving Mongols were led by their prince Turghai, a man of high status and closely connected to the great Hulagu, being his son-in-law and a personality that would make them look significant to Sultan Kitbugha.

- Their arrival was grandly welcomed by Sultan Kitbugha himself, who generously granted them royal presents, allowances and let them settle in Al Ablaq palace. Other statesmen, including his deputy, participated in welcoming them.
- The Mongol convoy was not only made of strong men, but also included old men, women and children. This clearly indicates that they came intending to settle in the host country, apart from seeking refuge and support from a member of their own race, who was sure to be sympathetic with their plight, being one of them. Kitbugha did all that and granted them asylum and land in Egypt to settle in.
- The arriving Mongols did not believe in the true principles of Islam. Some even contradicted these principles. They did not fast Ramadan, which is mandatory to true believers in Islam. They slaughtered horses in a way forbidden by Sharia law. Hence, Egyptians abhorred them, while Al Adel Kitbugha was tolerant with them as Mongols, irrespective of whether they were devout Moslems or not. Ibn Hajar wrote, 'Kitbugha honored them, even though they openly ate in Ramadan' [114]. Another sign of their weak Islam was mentioned by historian Al Birzali in 696 Hij. When a group of Tatars, about 40, who were converted Islam and settled in Egypt, wanted to return home, they denounced Islam. They were confronted by the Arabs of Al Sakhray, who blocked their way back and killed most of them at the Qabaqib well [115]. These were probably bandits aiming to rob them of their possessions and found the excuse in their denunciation of Islam [116].
- Their elders used to sit at the Citadel's gate with princes. This proves they were highly esteemed by the Sultan, a thing that both Mamluks and ordinary Egyptians did not find acceptable at all.
- Kitbugha allowed the rest of the Oirati Mongols to settle along the coast, but were never allowed into Damascus. They had their markets outside, knowing that his people's bad and savage manners will not be tolerated by the Damascenes and that this may lead to trouble and unrest among Moslems.
- Those who settled along the coast and away from Egypt had a disastrous fate.

To conclude, Sultan Al Adel Kitbugha was both compassionate and biased to people of his own race at a level unprecedented among Sultans. In doing so, he clearly showed the ordinary people in Egypt and the Levant that he was proud of his Mongol origin. Despite being a Moslem Sultan, he defiantly welcomed and

honored people lacking in good faith, a thing that turned the hearts of people in Egypt and the Levant away from him and later justified his ousting.

Ibn Al Furat the historian mentioned another incident to prove Kitbugha's bias towards people of his own race. It is useful in the current research to highlight it in detail to reach plausible conclusions.

The incident occurred on Muharram 22nd, 696 Hij. When Al Adel Kitbugha left Damascus to head home to Egypt. High ranking princes had already decided to remove him. Upon reaching Al Awjaa' [117], he sat in the royal hall and princes were recalled for a hearing. He inquired about prince Badr El Din Bisri and ordered that he be brought in. When the latter arrived, Kitbugha didn't stand up to greet him as was customary. On the contrary, he spoke harshly to him and accused him of corresponding with Tatars and plotting with them to depose him. The Sultan then rose and left the meeting in anger. Subsequently, the princes gathered in prince Husam El Din Lajin's tent (the Sultanate deputy in Egypt) and discussed the Sultan's accusations. Prince Badr El Din Bisri asked prince Husam El Din why the Sultan was that harsh with him. The latter told him that his Mamluks wrote letters to the Tatars and ascribed them to Badr El Din Bisri and that the Sultan's intension, once they reached the Mount Citadel, was to arrest them both (Badr El Din Bisri and Husam El Din Lajin), together with senior princes and replace them with his own Mamluks. It was then that they decided to remove him [118].

An historical critique:

- Prince Badr El Din Bisri was a close associate of Sultan Al Adel Kitbugha and was fully aware of all matters of the Sultanate. It was customary for the Sultan to stand up and greet him, but in this incident he did not.
- The Sultan's Mamluks, including prince Badr El Din Bisri, knew their Sultan's bias to the Mongols and the influence that Mongol leaders had on him. Hence by corresponding with the Mongols to remove him, they hoped that this might sour the relation between them.
- Al Adel was upset by the conspiracy against him and acted accordingly. He showed his anger to the conspirators, including prince Badr El Din Bisri and did not welcome him standing as was customary. He spoke harshly to him and accused him of conspiring with the Mongols to topple him.
- It seems that Al Adel's Mongol origin and his bias to people of his own race gave them the right to meddle with the politics of the Sultanate. Al Adel's Mamluks,

including prince Badr El Din Bisri, knew only too well the extent of the influence that Mongols had on their master. Hence, they used this knowledge to prove his allegiance and bias towards them and that he received orders from them. This was the reason he became so furious and left the meeting.

There's another incident that historians often mention to prove the impact of Al Adel's Mongol origin on his relation to them. It was mentioned by Ibn Jazri and iterated by Ibn Kathir and Ibn Taghribirdi that Hulagu, King of the Mongols, asked Nasir El Din Al Tusi, his fortune teller, who would rule Egypt of his own soldiers. The fortune teller replied 'Kitbugha' and Hulagu thought it was his own in-law who had the same name. Subsequently, he appointed that person commander of his army at the battle of Ain Jalut that took place in 658 Hij., 1259 AD, but he was killed there. Those historians admitted that the Kitbugha in this incident was not Al Adel Kitbugha who was enslaved after the first battle of Homs in the year 659 Hij., 1260 AD that took place during the reign of King Al Zaher Baibars [119].

This incident has a symbolic meaning in history as some contemporary historians used to refer to Al Tusi's prediction to prove Al Adel's bias towards his own Mongol race. However, it was refuted later by more accurate sources and they admitted they were wrong and misguided.

Fourth: His Deposition and Lajin's Accession: The coup took place at Al Lajun [120] near Al Fahma Valley [121] early on Monday, Muharram 28, 696 Hij., October 1296 AD. Prince Husam El Din Lajin killed two of Al Adel's closest allies; prince Seif El Din Betkhas Al Adli and prince Seif El Din Al Azraq Baktut Al Adli. He confiscated the State's treasury and put the army under his own command. When Al Adel Kitbugha knew this, he stealthily fled the palace on horseback [122].

In the month of Safar of the same year 696 Hij., November 1296 AD King Al Adel sought refuge in Damascus where he barricaded himself in its castle until he became sure that Al Mansur Lajin [123] was appointed as Sultan. 'Prince Lajin was unreasonably unfair with Kitbugha. He pretended to like him, but in reality, he hated him' [124].

When Al Adel realized that princes and ordinary people let him down, he told his associates about Lajin, 'He is my Khushdash (master) and I'm at his service. I will remain in some rooms in Damascus Castle until I receive written orders from the Sultan about my fate. I shall accept whatever he deems fit' [125].

After a few days, prince Husam El Din Lajin, the high commissioner arrived in Damascus with a written mandate from the new Sultan Al Mansur Lajin to the judges of Damascus. They were recalled to a meeting at Dar Al Sa'aadah to hear the Sultan's orders concerning Al Adel Kitbugha. Judge Badr El Din bin Jamaa'a Al Shafi'i arrived with other judges and King Al Adel was called upon to attend. The Sultan ordered Kitbugha to abdicate, go to Sarkhad and stay there. He would be provided for daily for the rest of his life. Kitbugha agreed to these instructions [126].

As if that was not enough humiliation, they forced him 'to swear his allegiance to the new Sultan King Mansur Husam El Din Lajin. He pledged loyalty and acceptance of his exile in the castle of Sarkhad and that he would never correspond with anyone, or attempt to corrupt anyone, together with other conditions set down to him' [127].

On Tuesday Rabie Al Awal 19, he left for Sarkhad [128] at night accompanied by some 200 knights to serve him. He left in style and honor with his children, Mamluks, servants and a caravan of camels and settled in Sarkhad [129].

In fact, Al Adel regretted what he did to prince Lajin, especially helping him to kill Al Ashraf and then appointing him deputy of Aleppo. Lajin showed no gratitude and on the contrary, was thankless to all these favors [130].

Ibn Taghribirdi mentioned that ordinary people were surprised at King Al Adel Kitbugha's easy and despicable abdication and his surrender without a fight to the humiliating orders he received from the new Sultan. Ibn Taghribirdi also mentioned that even if he (Al Adel) had only prince Aghazlu Al Adli, his deputy in the Levant, on his side, that would have been enough. Moreover, had he corresponded secretly with other princes in the Levant, as did Lajin and requested their support and the support of the Damascenes, he would have vanquished Lajin [131].

However, we see that this subservient surrender to the new Sultan was the result of princes' and ordinary people's reluctance to come to his rescue. Historians such as Ibn Habib stressed that this was also the case when princes were not willing to support him upon his return from Damascus. Ibn Habib wrote, 'They conspired against him during the trip and joined prince Husam Al Din Lajin, his deputy.'

He then mentioned people's unwillingness to be on his side when he returned to Damascus. He wrote, 'He returned to the castle of Damascus and people were just unwilling to support him. The military went as far as surrounding him, so he requested his own safety and abdicated' [132].

Amidst these tumultuous events, prince Aghazlu, his deputy in the Levant, seeing his master Al Adel give in to prince Lajin, turned against him and alleged that it was prince Lajin who appointed him deputy of Damascus! [133].

Kitbugha, the Kingdom of Hama and His Subsequent Demise: When Al Nasir Mohammad bin Qalawun regained his kingdom in 698 Hij., 1298 AD, he granted King Al Adel the kingdom of Hama and its surroundings. Of all his father's Mamluks, Al Nasir Mohammad favored him [134].

Regarding this matter, Ibn Taghribirdi wrote, 'It was an unprecedented matter that Kitbugha, after two years as Sultan of Egypt, with all the might of this status, Mamluks and entourage, should abdicate and become just another Sultan's deputy in the Levant. Something like this never happened before to previous kings' [135].

In another statement, Ibn Taghribirdi wrote, 'In his second Sultanate, King Al Nasir Mohammad ibn Qalawun transferred him as deputy from Sarkhad to Hama to become just another deputy to receive written orders from the Sultan, just like other deputies. He went to fight in the Tajarid (anti-piracy squad) in service of the deputy of the Levant and participated in the Jihad' [136].

Kitbugha continued to reign as king of Hama until he became poor of health and passed away in the eve of Eid Al Adha in the year 702 Hij., July 1302 AD. He was buried in Hama and later his remains were moved to Damascus where he was reburied on top of Mount Qaisun [137].

To conclude, Sultan Al Adel Kitbugha was a controversial figure among his contemporary and non-contemporary historians and among those who praised him and those who reviled him. His foreign origin and the tumultuous events of his life, which may or may not be due to his foreign origin, all make up an interesting biography. He was a Mongol prisoner of war, a Mamluk Sultan and finally a king of the Levant.

REFERENCES

1. Oirats: The name of a race used to refer to several Mongol tribes who settled along the upper Yenisei river basin in central Asia. They constituted the origin of the Kalmuck race. The Oirats were ruled by Genghis Khan and intermarried with his family. Al Maqrizi: *Al Suluk Lima'rifat Duwal Al Muluk*, Annotated edition, Ziadah, M. M. and A. A. Ashour, General Egyptian Organization for Authoring, Translating, Printing & Publishing, Ministry of Culture and National Guidance, Cairo 1934-1973, 1: 708, note # 3. Also, see *Encyclopedia of Islam. Art. Kalmucks*; Hwoorth: *History of the Mongols*, 1938, Brill, Netherland, Leiden, 1, pp: 681.
2. Ibn Kathir: *Al Bidaya Wal Nihaya*, 3rd ed. 1979, Al Ma'aaref Bookshop, Beirut, 13: 230 and pp: 338-339; Ibn Taghribirdi, *Al Nujum Al Zahira*, 1963-1972, General Egyptian Organization for Authoring, Translating, Printing & Publishing, Ministry of Culture and National Guidance, Cairo, 8: 55; Ibn Al Jazri, *Tarikh Hawadeth Al Zaman Wa Anbaa'uh*, wa *Wafiat Al Akaber Wal A'yan Min Abnaa'uh*, Annotated edition, Tadmuri, O. A. 2006, Modern Bookshop, Beirut, 1: 249; Al Siuti, A. *Al Muhadara fi Tarikh Masr Wal Qahira*, 2009, Mohammad Ibrahim, M. A. Annotated edition, Modern Bookshop, Beirut, 2: 88; Al Zahabi: *Duwal Al Islam*, 1974, Annotated edition, Shaltut, F. M. and M. M. Ibrahim, General Egyptian Book Organization, Cairo, 2: 196; Ibn Hajar Al Asqalani, *Al Dorar Al Kamina fi A'yan Al Ma'ah Al Thaminah*, no date, Dar Al Jil, Beirut, 3: 262.
3. Al Khaskia: a group of Mamluks who entered the Sultan's service at a young age. They were privileged with the right to appear before the Sultan without permission. They were also allowed to join him in his solitude, ride ahead of Al Mahamal Al Sharif, receive full salaries, perform official duties and ride with the Sultan day and night. They were 40 in number in the reign of Al Nasir Mohammad ibn Qalawun, Ibn Shahin Al Zahiri, *Zebdat Kashf Al Mamalik wa Bayan Al Turuq wal Masaalik*, 1894, Republican Printing Shop edition, Paris, pp. 115-116. Also, see Quatremer: *Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks*, 1969, Paris, 1, 2, p. 158, no 3.
4. Amir Ashara (Prince of Ten): a military rank in the Mamluk Army. Each had ten knights under his command. Young Walis (local governors) were appointed from holders of this rank. Dahman, M. A. 1990, *Dictionary of Historical Vocabulary*, Dar Al Fikr, Damascus, 1990, pp: 22.
5. Amir Tablakhanah: one of the princes who had the privilege of having drummers pay at their doorsteps. Each had 40-70 Mamluks at his service. He was only one step below Muqaddam Al Alf (leader of a thousand), M. A. Dahman, op. cit. p. 22.
6. Muqaddam Al Alf: (Leader of a thousand) a military rank with a thousand knights under his command, Al Qalqashandi, *Subh Al A'sha Fi Sinaa'it Al Insha*, 1963, Ministry of Culture and National guidance, General Egyptian Organization for Authoring, Translating, Printing & Publishing, Cairo, 2: 450 and 4: 14.
7. Al Zahabi, op. cit. vol 2, p. 196; Ibn Ayas, *Bada'I Al Zuhur fi Waqa' Al Duhur*, 1982-1984, Ziadah, M. M. Annotated edition, Center for Tahqiq Al Turath, Ministry of Culture and National Guidance, General Egyptian Book Organization edition, 2nd ed., 1/1, p. 386; Ibn Taghribirdi, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 55; Baibars Al Mansuri, *Al Tuhfa Al Mulukia fi Al Dawla Al Turkia*, Annotated edition, Hamdan, A. H. S., 1979, Egyptian Lebanese Publishing, Cairo, pp: 144.
8. Atabeg: A term used to refer to the general leader of the army. This was the most senior military rank and second only to the sponsoring deputy. See Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. vol. 4, p. 18, Dahman, M. A. op. cit. pp: 11.
9. Al Zahabi, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 196; Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1, p. 386; Al Maqrizi, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 806; Al Nujum Al Zahirah, vol. 8, p. 55; Baibars Al Mansuri, op.cit. pp: 144.
10. Al Selhidar: a compound term made up of two morphemes; first is Arabic meaning 'machine' and second is Persian meaning 'holder'. The term was used to refer to the bearer of the Sultan's weapon. His duties included supervision of the armory. See Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. vol 5, p. 456 and p. 462.
11. Al Saqi: The Sultan's waiter, whose duty was to serve drinks to the Sultan. He was supervised by Shad Al Sharab Khanah (the beverages head waiter), see Al Qalqashandi, op cit., 4: 21.
12. Al Jashinkir, someone entrusted with all kitchen matters (Al Simat) at the Sultan's palace. He was also responsible for discussing the Sultan's food and drinks with the Ustadar or the table servant. Their eldest was usually their most senior. See Al Qalqashandi, op cit. vol. 4, p. 21.
13. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 379.

14. Al Tasmir: (stripping and nailing) stripping naked a convicted felon then crucifying him. He would then be put on a camel back. Al Asfour, S. M., Torture instruments in the Mamluk era, January 2003. *Annals of Art and Social Sciences*, Ain-Shams University, Cairo, 1: 85.
15. Al Tashhir: (defamation) taking a convicted felon around the streets of Cairo and other towns, mounted on a camel or a donkey and publicly defaming him and exposing his ugly deeds. Al Asfour, S. M. op. cit. p. 85.
16. Al Mashaa'lia: torch or light bearers, Dahman, M. A. op. cit. p. 139.
17. Al Tawsit: A strong blow with a sword below the navel of a convict, strong enough to cut him in two and spill out his gut. Al Asfour, S. M., op. cit. p. 83.
18. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 379.
19. Khazanet Shamayel: (Shamayel prison) a notorious prison near Bab Zweilah and named after prince Alam El Din Shamayel, the Cairo governor during the reign of Al Kamel Mohammad bin Al Adel Abi Ayub. It was the most horrible and ugly looking prison, used to lock up criminals sentenced to death, thieves and Mamluks that the Sultan wanted them to perish. It was demolished by Sultan Al Mu'ayad Sheikh Al Mahmudi in 818 Hij., 1415 AD. He built a mosque and a school in its place. Al Maqrizi, *Al Mawa'iz wal I'tibar Bizikr Al Khutat wal Athar*, 2: 188; M. A. Dahman, op. cit. p.68.
20. Ibn Ayas, op.cit. 1/1: 379.
21. Al Sahib: a term used to refer to ministers and swordsmen of the army. In Mamluk era, the cabinet was an administrative body. See Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. pp.17-18.
22. Al Asr: a pressing instrument made up of two wooden bars tied together. A convict's arms or legs and sometimes head, were put between the two bars and the tie was tightened to crush the bones. S. M. Al Asfour, op. cit. p. 78.
23. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 379.
24. Op. cit. 1/1: 381.
25. Al Burjia: Tower Mamluks, also known as Jarkasi (Circassia) Mamluks. The former term was used as they mostly lived in the Citadel's towers on Al Muqattam mountain, the second term referred to their Circassia origin who lived north of the Caspian Sea and east of the Black Sea. Abul Fida wrote, 'Jerkas (Circassia) indicated a vast country north of Caucasia, which, in ancient times, extended from the Gulf of Constantinople to the surrounding western sea, Abul Fida, 1840, *Taqwim Al Buldan*, the Sultanate printers, Paris, p. 2; A. Majid, *Nuzum Dawlit Salatin Al Mamalik wa Resumuhum fi Masr*, 1979, 2nd edition, the Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1: 11; Al Asr Al Mamaliki fi Masr wal Sham, 1976, Dar Al Nahda Al Arabia, 2nd edition, Cairo, p. 141.
26. Al Barak: private possessions including clothes. M. A. Dahman, op. cit.
27. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 381.
28. Al Khashdashia: a term used to refer to Mamluk warriors who were brought up with the same master. They grew up as comrades, hence the Persian term 'Kushdash' meaning 'comrade'. M. A. Dahman, op. cit. pp. 68-69.
29. Umaraa' Al Ashrawat: Princes who had ten warriors each under their command. They sometimes had twenty. This division had no limit to the number of knights and increased or decreased randomly. It included low-key Walis (local governors) and professionals. Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. vol. 4, p. 15.
30. The Sultanate Mamluks: These were the highest rank in the military and were the closest to the Sultan. They were also the richest and their weapons varied according to the Sultan's preferences. See Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. vol. 4, pp.15-16; M. A. Dahman, op. cit. p. 145.
31. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 382.
32. Op. cit.
33. Ashrafia Mamluks: these were Mamluks of Sultan Al Ashraf Khaled who ruled between 689 Hij., 1290 AD and 693 Hij., 1293 AD. He was said to be fond of buying Mamluks and was rumored to have bought 6000 of them. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1, pp. 337-377.
34. Al Barqia: one of the gates of Cairo situated in the eastern wall. It was built by Jawhar Al Siqalli in 355 Hij., 965 AD. See Al Maqrizi, op. cit. Dar Sader edition, two volumes, no date, 1: 380-383.
35. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 383-384.
36. Al Ustadar: The Sultan's housekeeper. He was responsible for all royal residences from the kitchens to the food, drinks and stocks. He supervised the Sultan's attendants and service boys. His duties also included absolute control of all expenses of required clothes for all residents. It was customary for them to be 4, one was Muqaddam Alf (commander of a thousand), 3 Tablakhanah, though their number was sometimes less than that. Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. 4: 20.

37. Al Jashinkir: someone entrusted with all kitchen matters (Al Simat) at the Sultan's palace. He was also responsible for discussing the Sultan's food and drinks with the Ustadar or the table servant. Their eldest was usually their most senior. See Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. 4: 21.
38. Amir Akhor: The Sultan's stable chief and was also responsible for the Sultan's horses. It was customary that he should be at the rank of a commander of a thousand and took residence in the Sultan's stables. Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. 4: 18-19.
39. The jitar carrier: the Jitar was an umbrella with the shape of a bird on top. A senior prince was responsible for holding it over the Sultan's head. Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. 4: 46.
40. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 384-385.
41. Bab Sa'aadah: one of the gates of Cairo, named after Sa'aadah bin Hayyan, Al Mu'iz bidin Allah's boy servant. When Al Mu'iz bidin Allah arrived from Morocco after Jawhar Al Siqalli's completion of the construction of Cairo, he stopped at Jiza and Jawhar went out to meet him. When Sa'aadah saw Jawhar, he dismounted and walked to Cairo. That was in Rajab 360 Hij., 970 AD. He entered the city through this gate that came to be named after him. Al Maqrizi, op.cit. vol. 1, p.383.
42. Bab Zweilah: one of the gates of Cairo. It was rumored that the gate was built by three brothers who came from Arraha in 484 Hij., 1091 AD. Al Maqrizi, quoting ibn Abdel Zahir's Kitab Khutat Al Qahirah mentioned that Bab Zweilah was built by Al Aziz Billah Nazar bin Al Mu'iz and completed by the chief of staff Emir Badr El Din Al Jamali, Al Maqrizi, op. cit. pp. 380-381.
43. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 385.
44. Ibn Al Mughayzil, Zail Mufrij Al Kurub fi Akhbar bani Ayyub, Annotated edition, O. A. Tadmuri, 2004, Al Maktaba Al Asriya, Beirut, p. 158.
45. Al Zahabi, op. cit. 2: 162; Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 386; Ibn Taghribirdi, op. cit. 8: 55.
46. Baibars Al Mansuri, op. cit. p. 144.
47. Al Birzali, Al Muqtafi ala Kitab Arrawdatain: 2006, Al Ma'ruf fi Tarikh Al Birzali, Annotated edition, O. A. Tadmuri, Al Maktaba Al Asriya, Beirut, 2: 386.
48. Qal'it Al Jabal, the mountain citadel. A well-known citadel commissioned by Sultan Annasir Salah El Din Al Ayyubi and constructed by Al Tawashi Bahaa' El Din Qaraqush Al Asadi in 572 Hij., 1176 AD and subsequently became the king's residence. It is an elevated part of Al Muqattam mountain overlooking Cairo, the Nile and the cemetery. See Al Maqrizi, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 201.
49. Ibn Al Jazri, op. cit. vol.1, p. 247.
50. Op. cit. p. 248.
51. Bab Al Nasr: a famous gate to the city of Cairo, constructed by Jawhar Al Siqalli, which, as Al Maqrizi mentioned, was moved west from its original location on the corner of Al Qasidiya school to the new location near the Eid prayers area. See Al Maqrizi, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 381.
52. Bein Al Qasrein: a beautiful spacious area that came to be a recreation park for people in the Islamic era. It had numerous shops and markets and was situated between the old and the new palaces built during the Fatimid era. Al Maqrizi mentioned that in his time, this area became very crowded after evening prayers. It became a significant trade area after 886 Hij., 1481 AD. See Al Maqrizi, op. cit. 2: 28-29.
53. Ibn Al Jazri, op. cit. 1: 249-250.
54. Al Kutbi, I.S., 1973. Fawat Al Wafiyat Wal Zayl Aliha, Annotated edition, I. Abbas, Dar Sader, Beirut, 3: 219.
55. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 390.
56. Op. cit.
57. Ibn Al Emad Al Hanbali, Shazrat Azzahab fi Akhbar man Zahab, no date, Dar Ihya' Al Turath Al Arabi, Beirut, 6: 5.
58. Ibn Kathir, op. cit. 13: 339.
59. Ibn Kathir, op. cit. 13: 346; Ibn Tahgribirdi, op. cit. 8: 62; Ibn Al Furat, op. cit. 8: 221; Ibn Al Jazri, op. cit. 1: 329; Al Birzali, op. cit. 2: 484. Al Birzali mentioned that this occurred on Muharram 4th of the same year and later wrote, 'He was greatly thanked and his deed commended.'
60. Magharet Addamm (literally, the cave of blood): It is located in Damascus high in the mountain of Qaisun. There was a story about this cave when, it was said, Abel's blood, son of Adam (PUH), murdered by his brother Cain, left red traces on the stones. Ibn Batutah's narration of his journey, known as Tuhfit Al Nuzzar fi Ghara'ib Al Asfar, no date, Dar Al Kutub, Lebanese book house, the school library, Beirut, p. 72.
61. Al Birzali, op. cit. p. 487; Al Zahabi, op. cit. 2: 198.
62. Ibn Kathir, op. cit. 13: 346-347.

63. Al Kamiliya: This was a cemetery with a door that opened on the Grand Amawi Mosque, east of Al Khanqah Al Semisaatiya (a sophist school). When King Al Kamil Mohammad bin Al Adil Al Ayyubi was crowned ruler of Damascus, he lived and died there. His three daughters bought a place near Bab Al Natfaiyin and constructed a cemetery with windows that opened on the mosque and brought in Qur'an recitalists. See Al Na'imi, *Addares fi Tarikh Al Madaris*, 1981, Dar Al Kitab Al Jadid, Beirut, 2: 277.
64. Ibn Kathir, op. cit. 13: 347.
65. Ibn Kathir, op. cit. 13: 348; Ibn Taghribirdi, op. cit. 13: 65; Ibn Al Furat, op. cit. 8: 225.
66. Ibn Taghribirdi, op. cit. 8: 62.
67. Op. cit. 8: 68.
68. Al Birzali, op. cit. 3: 229.
69. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 393.
70. Baibars Al Mansuri, op. cit. p.144.
71. Op. cit.
72. Op. cit. p.147.
73. O. cit.
74. Op. cit. pp.147-148.
75. Op. cit. p. 148.
76. Al Dawadar: (literally, the ink bearer) this was the title used to refer to whoever was entrusted with the duty of carrying the Sultan's ink bottle. This was a compound term made up of two parts; an Arabic morpheme 'Al Dawah' meaning 'ink' and a Persian morpheme 'Dar' meaning 'to hold'. A Dawadar's duties included circulation of messages on behalf of the Sultan and acquainting him of public matters. He also told him stories, presented mail, together with the Jandar and the Sultan's confidante. He was also in charge of getting the Sultan's signature on mandates and letters. When the Sultan issued a mandate, he would edit it first. He also presented mail which the Sultan's confidante read aloud for him before deciding. See Al Maqrizi, op. cit. 2: 222; Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. 4: 19 and 5: 462; Ibn Tolon, Naqd Attalib Lizaghl ilmanasib, 1992, Annotated edition, M. A. Dahman and K. A. Dahman, Jum'a Al Malik Center for Culture and Heritage, Dubai, Dar Al Fikr, Beirut, p. 59. See also, Dozy, *Supplement aux dictionnaires Arabes*, 1881, 2 vols, Leiden, 1: 469.
77. The Citadel's deputy in Cairo: he was assigned supervision of the Citadel and his rank was below the Sultanate deputy. His duties included maintenance thereof and getting it ready for the Sultan or whoever had a written mandate to act on his behalf. Moreover, he was responsible for refurbishing, supervision of weaponry and maintenance of its gates. Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. vol. 4, pp. 184-185 and vol. 11, p. 91.
78. Dar Al Adl Asharif: (the honorable justice house) located in the Citadel and attended by the Divan chief scribe and secretaries who accompanied the Sultan, or an authorized deputy, to attend sessions and examine petitions and complaints. A. M. Majid, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 66.
79. Nuzur Al Awqaf Al Mabru: (Al Waqf offices) also known as Nuzur Al Ahbas Al Mabru. This was a high-ranking position for a select official who decided the budget for mosques and religious schools from Al Waqf holdings. Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. vol. 4, p. 38.
80. Hamdan, A. S. *Al Tuhfa Al Mulukia fi Al Dawla Al Turkia*, op. cit. pp. 7-8.
81. Al Marqadariyya: (singular Marqadar) Supervisors of the Sultan's kitchen. He used to taste soups and food before serving to the Sultan. Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. vol. 5, p. 470.
82. Al Maqrizi, *Assuluk*, vol.1, p. 807.
83. Ibn Al Furat, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 193.
84. Op. cit.
85. Ibn Taghribirdi, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 69.
86. Op. cit.
87. Al Khaskiya: see note # 2 above.
88. Al Hasan Al Safdi, A. 2003. *Nuzhat Al Mamalik wal Mamluk fi Mukhtasar Sirit man tawalla Masr min Al Muluk*, Annotated edition, O. A. Tadmuri, Al Maktaba Al Asriya, Beirut, p.171.
89. Al Zahabi, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 197.
90. Ibn Duqmaq, 1985. *Al Jawhar Assamin fi siar Al Muluk wassalatin*, Annotated edition, M. K. E. Ali, Alam Al Kutub, Beirut, vol. 2, p. 121; Also, see Al Nafha Al Miskiyya fi Addawalh Atturkiyya, by the same author, annotated edition, by O. A. Tadmuri, 1999. Al Maktaba Al Asriya, Beirut, p. 99.
91. Al Tajarid: (singular 'Tajridah') a regiment of the cavalry responsible for anti-piracy duties. They were trained to be swiftly dispatched to perform their duties. Mohammad Ahmad Dahman, op. cit. p. 42; Al Baqli, M. Q. 1983. *Atta'rif bi Mustalahat Subh Al a'sha*, General Egyptian Book Organization, Cairo, p.73.
92. Ibn Taghribirdi, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 68.

93. Op. cit. vol. 8, p. 69.
94. Op. cit. p. 55; Ibn Kathir, op. cit. vol. 13, p. 343.
95. Ibn Kathir, op. cit. vol. 13, p. 343.
96. Ibn Al Furat, op. cit. vol.8, pp: 204-205.
97. Al Qasr Al Ablaq: (Al Ablaq palace) commissioned by Sultan Al Nasir Mohammad bin Qalawun in 713 Hij., 1313 AD. It overlooked his stables and had a staircase for moving crops to it. Al Maqrizi, Al Mawa'iz wal I'tibar Bizikr Al Khutat wal Athar, vol. 2, pp. 209-210.
98. Al Tablakhanah: (literally house of drummers) it contained drums and other instruments and was supervised by an Emir Asharah known as Emir Alam (flag prince). His duty was to supervise drummers playing every night and was also responsible for them on the move. Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. 4: 13.
99. Rakt: a Persian word meaning decorative clothes made of expensive material. It also meant household furniture, princes' and Sultan's clothes. Al Qalqashandi, op. cit. vol. 5, p. 471, Mohammad Ahmad Dahman, op. cit. p.82.
100. Ibn Taghribirdi, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 60; Ibn Al Furat, op. cit. vol.8, pp. 203-204; Ibn Al Jazri, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 287; Baibars Al Mansuri, op. cit. p.146. He mentioned that the Oirat Mongols came in the year 695 Hij.
101. Al Fakheri, B.B., 2010. Attarikh Al Fakheri. Annotated edition, Tadmuri, O. A. , Al Maktaba Al Asriya, Beirut, vol. 1, p. 155.
102. Ibn Habib, 1976. Tazkarit Annabih fi Ayyam Al Mansur wa Banih, Annotated edition, Amin, M. M. and S. A. Ashour, Daar Al Kutub, Cairo, 1: 185.
103. Ibn Al Jazri, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 287.
104. Ibn Hajar, op. cit. vol. 3, p. 264.
105. Ibn Al Furat, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 204.
106. Al Inzal: Al Nazl meant whatever was prepared to welcome guests and 'Inzal Alqawm' meant people's provisions. Ibn Manzur, Lisan Al Arab, no date, Dar Al Ma'arif, Cairo, vol. 6, p. 4400.
107. Bab Al Qillah: known as such because of a dome built by king Azzahir Baibars and demolished by king Al Mansur Qalawun on Rajab 11th 685 Hij., August 1286 AD. In its place, he commissioned a dome that was completed in the month of Shawwal of the same year. This too was demolished by king Al Nasir Mohammad bin Qalawun and the whole Bab Al Qillah was renovated. Al Maqrizi, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 212.
108. Baibars Al Mansuri, op. cit. p. 146.
109. Athlith: a well-guarded castle in the Levant coast connecting Haifa with Qaisariya. It was conquered and taken by king Al Nasir Yusuf ibn Ayyub in 583 Hij., 1187 AD, Yaqut Al Hamawi, Mu'jam Al Buldan, vol. 4, p. 85.
110. Al Kiswah: a village that was the first stop for caravans leaving Damascus. It was rumored that it was the place the Ghassani tribe killed the Roman messengers who had come to collect the Jiziah and divided their clothes among them. Mu'jam Al Buldan, vol. 4, p. 461.
111. Al Sinman: a village to the south of Damascus at the beginning of Al Hawran road and at about 12 miles from Al Kisawah and another 12 miles from Al Kiswah to Damascus, Mu'jam Al Buldan, vol. 3, p. 431; Abul Fida, 1840. Taqwim Al Buldan, Dar Sader photocopied edition of the Sultanate printing, Paris, p. 253.
112. Ibn Al Jazri, op. cit. vol. 1, pp. 287-288; Ibn Al Furat, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 205.
113. Ibn Al Furat, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 205.
114. Ibn Hajar, op. cit. vol.3, p. 263.
115. Bir Qabaqib: (Qabaqib well) a well that belonged to Bani Taghlib in Al Jazeera. It was also the name of a river that flowed into the Euphrates near Maltia. I believe the former was the intended meaning. Mu'jam Al Buldan, vol. 4, p. 303.
116. Al Birzali, op. cit. vol. 3, p. 516.
117. Al Awjaa': a Palestinian village near Al Ramlah which was about 12 miles from Hebron and had plenty of water. Mu'jam Al Buldan, vol. 4, p. 176; Al Maqrizi, Al Suluk, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 819.
118. Ibn Al Furat, op. cit. vol. 8, pp. 220-221; Al Maqrizi, op. cit. vol. 1, p.819.
119. Ibn Kathir, op. cit. vol. 13, pp.230, 338-339; Ibn Taghribirdi, op. cit. vol. 8, p.55; Ibn Al Jazri, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 249. See also Ibn Al Furat, op. cit. vol.8, p. 192.
120. Allajun: a town in Jordan about 20 miles from Tabariya and 40 miles from the Palestinian Al Ramleh, Yaqut Al Hamawi, op. cit. vol.5, p.13.
121. Fahma: a village belonging to the city of Jenin in Palestine.
122. Ibn Al Jazri, op. cit. vol. 1, pp.331-332; Al Birzali, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 492; Badr El Din Biktash, op. cit. vol.1, p. 156; Ibn Shakir Al Kutbi, op. cit. vol.3, p.218; Ibn Hajar, op. cit. vol. 3, p. 272. Ibn Hajar said that 'princes Biktash and Baktut were close allies of Kitbugha.'

123. Ibn Al Jazri, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 333.
124. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 394.
125. Ibn Al Furat, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 226; Ibn AlJazri, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 333; Al Birzali, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 497; Ibn Hajar, op. cit. vol. 3, p. 263.
126. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 392.
127. Ibn Al Furat, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 228; Ibn Al Jazri, op. cit. vol. 1, pp. 335-336; Al Birzali, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 502; Al Maqrizi, op. cit. vol. 1, pp. 825-826.
128. Sarkhad: a village in the vicinity of Damascus near Horan and at a distance of 10-day walk from Baghdad and one-day walk from the town Zar' in Horan. Abul Fida, Taqwim Al Buldan, pp. 825-826.
129. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 392; Ibn Al Jazri, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 337; Al Birzali, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 505; Ibn Shakir Al Kutbi, op. cit. vol.3, p. 218; Ibn Hajar, op. cit. vol. 3, p. 263; Al Maqrizi, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 826.
130. Ibn Taghribirdi, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 64.
131. Op. cit. p. 64.
132. Ibn Habib, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 193.
133. Ibn Taghribirdi, op. cit. vol. 8, p.67.
134. Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 392.
135. Ibn Taghribirdi, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 69.
136. Op. cit.p.69.
137. Ibn Taghribirdi, op. cit. vol. 8, pp. 68-69; Ibn Duqmaq, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 120; Ibn Ayas, op. cit. 1/1: 392.