

Diplomatic Imperatives of Xenophobic Attacks on Diaspora Populations in South Africa

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Abstract: The rising spate of xenophobic attacks against foreigners in different countries largely threatens the safety and well-being of diaspora populations around the world. Consequently, a lot of diplomatic questions have been raised with respect to the responsibility of states to protect the lives and property of citizens both within and across national boundaries. Unfortunately, there are several indications that both the home-country and the host-country have failed in this responsibility to protect the citizens thereby questioning the diplomatic essence of foreign missions in the affected countries. This study is an attempt not only to highlight the causes, forms and implications of xenophobic attacks against diaspora populations, but also to advance some diplomatic imperatives required to address the rising trends. In the light of relative deprivation theory and content analysis techniques, it is observed that xenophobic attacks are to large extents partly caused by the employment of desperate foreigners as strike breakers; jealousy over foreigners' business prosperity; and perception of foreigners as sources of crimes. Thus, addressing xenophobic attacks against diaspora populations largely depends on the effective application of citizen diplomacy and prioritizing the doctrine of reciprocity.

Key words: Citizen • Diplomacy • Xenophobia • Diaspora • Population

INTRODUCTION

Series of xenophobic attacks against Nigerians and some other Africans have been recorded in South Africa, India and Kenya. These attacks have largely threatened the security of the lives and property of Nigerians in those countries to the extent that entire Diaspora Population is no longer safe. The xenophobic attacks which erupted in South Africa and India were sparked by the *death or killing of the citizens* believed to have been caused by foreigners. For instance, the xenophobic violence which erupted in Soweto in January 2015 was sparked by the killing of a 14 year old South African boy by a Somali who claimed the boy was part of a group which tried to rob his shop. In view of this, On 15 March 2015, King Goodwill Zwelithini, the King of the Zulu nation, addressed a moral regeneration event in Pongola, Kwa-Zulu Natal where he stated that "*government is not protecting citizens from the influx of foreigners*". He also said that "*foreigners must please go back to their countries*".

It seems that his speech was misconstrued by some as an order to take the law into their own hands and chase foreigners out of South Africa as portrayed in Sunday Times, of 19 April 2015. Notably, the Zulu king is respected by his people; if he gives an instruction, the majority is likely to obey. Similarly, in India, Nigerian and other African students came under attack from Indian crowds; Five Nigerians were beaten and badly wounded in Noida, a town in Uttar Pradesh state, on Monday 10th April, 2017 because of their alleged link to the death of an Indian student. Some were beaten by a mob in the district of Greater Noida, a suburb of Delhi, until they became unconscious. Indian police however said the cause of the student's death remains unknown. It is however noted that it was not the first time African students have been attacked in India over the past years.

The xenophobic violence in South Africa started in Durban. Foreign shop owners were the first targets and then followed foreigners in general. The violence spread to Gauteng, where foreigners in townships and informal settlements were killed and assaulted. In view of this,

political leaders called for calm; but government was criticized for being slow to intervene. King Zwelithini refused to apologize for the speech that engineered the immediate crisis; instead, he blamed the media for misrepresenting his comments. On Monday 20 April, he called an *'imbizo'* (community gathering) where he called for calm and asked that locals must protect foreigners; however, it was a little late because the xenophobia violence had already spread to Gauteng and the death toll as a result of the violence increased and many foreigners were displaced.

In the light of the foregoing exposé, one ponders on the forms, causes and remedies to the xenophobic attacks on foreigners and more precisely, the Nigerian Diaspora in South Africa. This is therefore an attempt to investigate the following:

- What are the forms of the xenophobic attacks on Nigerians in South Africa?
- What are the causes of the xenophobic attacks on Nigerians in South Africa?
- What are the implications of the xenophobic attacks on Nigerians in South Africa?
- What are the diplomatic imperatives for addressing the xenophobic attacks on Nigerians in South Africa?

Review of Related Literature

Theoretical Review: Attempts to define “Xenophobia” have been met with conceptual diversity ranging from contents to contexts. As was defined by the Webster’s dictionary, xenophobia is *“the fear and/or hatred of strangers or foreigners or of anything that is different or foreign”*. But some writers like [1] and [2], contend that xenophobia does not end with mere attitudes but also involves actions, practice, violence and physical abuse against specific targets. Hence, beyond mere dislike and fear there must be actions of violence that result in bodily harm or damage to property of the target population [2]. In other words, the definition of xenophobia includes a specific target of particular individuals or groups against whom the fear and hate actions of violence are directed. In this light, [3] asserted that the South African case presents all three ingredients: *a demonstrated fear or hate of black foreigners accompanied by violent actions, resulting in loss of life and property*. Three theories have been advanced to explain the Xenophobia in South Africa: *Scapegoating theory*, *Isolation theory* and *Bio-cultural theory* [3].

The Scapegoating theory interprets xenophobia from the context of social transition change in which rejection

of, or hostility to foreigners is related to limited resources like housing, education, education, health care and unemployment in a period marked with high expectations especially for black South Africans [4]. Hence, instead of turning to the government to provide the deficient social amenities, the citizens of South Africa use the African non-nationals as “Scapegoat” blamed for using and depriving them of their facilities. For instance, the common belief in South Africa is that “every job given to a foreign national is one less job for a South African”; this was believed to have been exacerbated by the unemployment rate which was between 20%-30% as at 2011. Besides, foreign nationals are known to find shelter in informal urban settlements characterized by high levels of poverty, unemployment and housing shortages. Thus, competition for already limited resources is intense. Consequently, the black foreign nationals are placed as scapegoat for the increasing poverty and unemployment in South Africa. The immigrant populations are therefore seen as mere opportunists who are only in South Africa for economic benefits [5]. But [3] observed that there is no empirical evidence to prove some of these claims; for instance, some categories of African migrants work have been shown to actually increase employment opportunities for South Africans.

The Isolation theory postulates that xenophobia is a function of the Apartheid Rule in South Africa which secluded the country from the rest of the world [4]. As a consequence, the South African Communities have continued to have fear and distrusts towards foreigners and reacts to the slightest provocation. According to this theory, the freedom felt within South Africa in 1994 came with the ideology that the country must be protected from “outsiders”. In the light of South Africa’s history, it is reasonable that the country needed to put its citizens first-in-line for transformation and change. However, the closed-door migration policies, sluggish development and increase in poverty and inequality have provided a breeding ground for xenophobia. Following South Africa’s democratic transition, the refugee act took 4 years to draft and 8 years to negotiate. One of the primary reasons why it took South Africa such time to replace apartheid regime’s “Alien’s Control Act” was that the idea of migration created uncertainty in nationals and migration was seen as undesirable [6]. But despite resistance to foreigners, the democratic and political transition opened up South Africa’s borders and the country became generally integrated into the international community. As a result, South Africans were brought into direct contact with unfamiliar foreigners [7]. The isolation

theory's contextualization of xenophobia therefore rests on the central premise that "*where a group has history of interacting with the outside world and incorporating strangers, that group is blinded to the opportunities of welcoming those that may be different or foreign*" [8].

The *bio-cultural* theory suggests that xenophobic violence is not applied equally to all foreigners. In the case of South Africa, black foreigners are at greater risk of violence than foreigners of other race groups [9]. For instance, usually on arrival in South Africa, many foreign nationals seek shelter in urban informal settlements where there is intense competition for basic resources. The bio-cultural hypothesis emphasizes the levels of visible differences in the physical demeanour of other foreign Africans [2]. Invariably, the bio-cultural theory could explain the violence targeted against even South Africans who were thought to be foreign on the basis of skin colour or speech. For instance, out of the 62 people who died in the 2008 attacks, 21 were South African citizens. As some of the local South African languages are spoken by neighbouring countries, this has led to cases where a local could be seen as a foreigner and targeted during xenophobic attacks [10]. This theory holds that Nigerians and Congolese are more easily identifiable as the 'other', because of their physical features and their inability to speak one of the indigenous languages [2]. By implication, if they are more easily identified, it follows that they are more easily targeted. Hence, the bio-cultural features of black African foreign nationals – things such as their accent, their language and the clothes they wear – have made them easily identifiable in South African communities and this makes them easy targets. However, while the bio-cultural theory offers a good basis to understand the theoretical notion behind xenophobia, [2] points out that it is not good enough, as it does not explain why mainly black African foreign nationals are attacked during xenophobic violence outbreaks instead of other foreign nationals such as Europeans or Chinese.

Empirical Review: [3], carried out a study on the theme, "It is not just Xenophobia: Factors that Leads to Violent Attacks on Foreigners in South Africa and the Role of Government". The objective of the study was to establish that there are other multiple factors beyond xenophobia that lead to attacks on foreigners in South Africa. Drawing instances from other studies carried out, the analysis showed that there are some common xenophobic sentiments held by a large number of the South African Community: (i) the high rate of crime and violence (like gun running, drug trafficking and armed robbery) is

directly related to the rising number of illegal migrants in South Africa; (ii) nationals of South Africa are "particularly intolerant of non-nationals and especially African non-nationals; (iii) South Africans are exceptionally xenophobic given that 25% of persons interviewed support a total ban on immigration, 45% support strict limitation on the number of immigrants, others opposed offering access to African non-citizens the same access to housing like South Africans; (iv) immigrants place additional stress on the economy. Consequently, 65% of the black respondents stated that they would "likely" or "very likely" "take action" to prevent people from other countries from operating business in their area. Historically, South Africa xenophobic tendencies against foreigners and more specifically African Migrants began since 1994 with derogatory reference terms like "Amakwerekwere" or "Amagribamba" used to inflict "intimidation" and "hate" on immigrants. Notably, the xenophobic attacks had specific *targets* and *locations*: while the *targets* were African foreign nationals and not on all foreigners; the *location* was confined to the urban informal settlements in South Africa's major cities. For instance, the 1995 *Buyelekhaya Campaign* was in Alexandra and targeted mainly the Zimbabweans, Malawians and Mozambicans for some reasons which include that they were guilty of causing: *crimes and sexual attacks; unemployment; spreading of AIDs*. For all these attacks, [3], shares the opinion that they were not caused by xenophobia alone; instead, some historical antecedents like being secluded from the rest of Africans through apartheid policy largely contributed. Besides, government played roles that encouraged xenophobic sentiments in the sense that it did not recognize xenophobic attacks as a problem; community leaders and local political authorities do nothing to prevent or stop violent attacks on foreigners; some were directly involved in the attacks; others were reluctant to assist foreigners for fear of losing legitimacy or positions of authority; and some national leaders use anti-immigration language during their campaigns to gain votes. Among other things, the [3], recommended that xenophobia should first be acknowledged as a problem in South Africa; the root causes of xenophobia should be addressed; the public should be informed of the rights of migrants and refugees living in South Africa; labour disparities should be addressed and partnership and sharing between citizens and foreigners should be encouraged; public officials, police officers and local leaders should be held accountable for their role in spreading xenophobia.

[11] discussed “Violence, Xenophobia and Crime: Discourse and Practice”. The objective of the study was to deconstruct the claims of the South African Minister of Police and other prominent politicians that the violence against foreign nationals is “Crime” and not “Xenophobia”. In doing this, [11] clarified the concepts of crime and xenophobia. Hence, [11] noted that describing violence against foreign nationals as 'crime' is, of course, empirically correct because Murder, grievous bodily harm, arson, intimidation, incitement to commit violence, robbery and looting etc. are against the law in South Africa. But the nature and causes of the violence against foreign nationals which is propelled by the fear that foreign nationals are taking over their “entitlements” makes the “crime” “xenophobic”. [11] argues that despite the claims of the South African Police and some politicians like Nathi Mthethwa (minister of police), the South African Communist Party, the South African Police Service Captain and acting executive director for Safety and Security at Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, that the violence against foreign nationals is just crime and not xenophobia, some institutional actions taken largely prove them wrong and hypocritical. Some of these actions include insufficient protection of victims, half-hearted investigations against perpetrators and in some cases outright collusion with attackers; appointment of national coordinator for xenophobia at director level in the police department; establishment of specialized team to collect and collate crime intelligence data concerning crimes against foreign nationals, in order to establish patterns and assist in prevention and response planning; all this point to the fact that the crimes are xenophobic, as such, [11] queried:

If the police's actions suggest a recognition that violence against foreigners is a significant category of crimes, deserving special structures and attention, and if the interventions based on this recognition have been effective, why be concerned with a rhetorical distinction between 'crime' and 'xenophobia'?

[11], observed that in-depth studies of twelve places where violence occurred in and since May 2008 have consistently identified localized competition for (formal and informal) political and economic power as the immediate triggers for violence. Meanwhile, leaders and aspirant leaders mobilized residents to attack and evict foreign nationals as a means of *strengthening their personal political or economic power within the local*

community. In many instances, violence was organized by South African business owners' intent on eliminating foreign competitors. [11] therefore concluded that the violence against African foreign nationals in South Africa is not just a crime, but xenophobia because: first, the prevalent sentiments against foreign nationals which, while not sufficient to create violence on their own, nonetheless enable mobilisation against this particular group; second, the perceived structural 'outsiderness' of foreigners, which creates a sense of impunity for crimes committed against this group.

[12], wrote a policy brief on “Responding to Xenophobia: What Can South Africa Learn from Côte d'Ivoire?” The objective of the brief was to advance some lessons from Côte d'Ivoire for South Africa in handling the xenophobic attacks. Using the case of Côte d'Ivoire, this policy brief aimed to draw a number of issues which South Africans and their leaders should avoid in the handling of the recent attacks on foreigners. [12], argued that although Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa differ in many ways, an analysis of the securitization of identity in Côte d'Ivoire can be helpful to raise awareness regarding the risks of unquestioned securitization as a possible solution to immigration. Hence, the policy brief provided first, an analysis of the securitization of identity in Côte d'Ivoire and the long-term impact it had on peace and security in the country; second, an analytical overview of government response to the recent xenophobic attacks. [12] contended that the securitization of identity, ethnicity and citizenship became the main threat to peace mainly because the roles of government could not sufficiently address the identity crisis and the associated consequences. Citing [13], [12] observed that the source of Côte d'Ivoire's “nightmare” was when Bédié portrayed the *allogènes* as “aliens, foreigners, others who are invading the country and posing a political and economic threat to the autochthones...” Although Bédié initially claimed that the use of the concept of *ivoirity* was only aimed at creating cultural unity among Ivoirians, it soon became obvious that the doctrine was a strategic political move aimed at excluding Alassane Ouattara in the 1995 elections. The use of *ivoirity* also had an impact beyond the political sphere and “led to a general erosion of Northern Ivoirians' social standing and cultural status, *de facto* making them secondary citizens in Côte d'Ivoire”. This exacerbated intergroup ethnic tensions and divisions and increased resentment among the excluded Northern population. The concept of *Ivoirity* encouraged the predominantly Christian Southerners to view themselves as true Ivoirians and characterized the overwhelmingly

Muslim Northerners as foreigner or non-Ivorians. By 2002 a failure of the successive governments after Bédié to deal with the identity and economic crises plunged Côte d'Ivoire into a decade long civil war. [12], therefore asserts that if South African leaders continue to downplay the question of xenophobic attacks, the country may as well be plunged into civil war since at times, some South Africans are also included among "African Foreigners" due to language, intonation and skin colour.

[14], examined "Refugees, Safety and Xenophobia in South African Cities: The Role of Local Government". The concern of the study was to investigate the roles played by local government in relation to the safety of South Africa's immigrant population especially in the face of Xenophobia. Palmary argued that even though there are relatively sufficient enabling laws allowing refugees to seek employment and access education as well as some other rights in South Africa (with the exception of political rights and the rights to freedom of trade, occupation and profession, which do not apply to non-citizens); nothing is explicitly said, however, about the right to access other basic services such as housing, water, sanitation and safety. Essentially, many of these rights are met through services delivered at a local government level; but the role of local government in the provision of services to refugees has not been clearly spelled out, either in the Refugee Act or in other policy documents. Besides, little is said about the potential barriers that exist to refugees accessing local services, in spite of the enabling legislation being in place. There is also no indication whether these services should be delivered under the same conditions that services are delivered to South Africans. For example, it does not state whether primary health care, if available to asylum seekers, would be free, as it is for South Africans. In spite of this lack of clarity about the role of the different tiers of government in the provision of rights that refugees are entitled to, local governments are increasingly coming into contact with migrant groups of different kinds. Hence, Palmary asserts that the local governments need to begin to identify their role in relation to providing services and safety to refugee communities. The fact that the rights of immigrant population in South Africa have limited rights to basic needs, it is difficult not to seek for them because they are indispensable in human life. Thus, that the constitution and government do not provide for them does not mean that they do not need them; this brings about the competition and xenophobia of possibly being outcompeted sets in.

DISCUSSION

The Forms of the Xenophobic Attacks on Nigerians in South Africa:

The xenophobic attacks took various forms like: *Eviction, beating, incarceration, killing* of the Diaspora population as well as *looting and burning of shops and institutions*. The first major incidence of xenophobic violence in South Africa took place in Johannesburg in May 2008. [15] acknowledged that as many as sixty-two people were killed during the 2008 xenophobic attacks and as many as 16 000 displaced; 21 of those killed were South Africans mostly of Shangaan origin on the suspicion was that *they were too dark* or *they couldn't speak Zulu* fluently. This drew international attention to xenophobia in South Africa. The attacks were initially selective before turning to general attacks on all African foreigners.

The Causes of the Xenophobic Attacks on Nigerians in South Africa:

The causes of the attacks were blamed on: *the employment of desperate foreigners as strike breakers; jealousy over foreigners' business prosperity; perception of foreigners as sources of crimes; and the killing of a 14 year old South African boy by a Somali*.

The employment of desperate foreigners generated the fears that the diaspora population in the identified countries threatens the employment and job opportunities of the citizens. For instance, in South Africa and Kenya, it was acknowledged that the Nigerian Diaspora especially, Medical Doctors, are used to foil the industrial actions of the labour unions in the sense that they are employed to substitute the indigenous workers each time they went on strike. However Jeremy Cronin, the Deputy Minister of Transport stated that: "*one of the triggers for the latest flare-up was the employment of desperate foreigners as strike breakers in an industrial dispute in Isipingo just days before the violence*". There is a tendency to employ part-time workers if there is a strike and usually this creates hostility.

Besides, the businesses of the diaspora population are alleged to be more prosperous than those of the citizens. In January 2015, xenophobic violence erupted in Soweto and the targets were foreigners mainly Somali and Pakistanis who owned small shops which are commonly known as "*spazas*". In a number of townships in South Africa, foreigners rent space in the yards of South Africans where they operate *spazas* some pay up to R3000 a month for rent. The money is a livelihood for some South Africans who may not have anyone employed in

their home. The damages to foreign owned businesses in 2008 were as high as R1.5 million, with victims having no means of recouping these losses [16].

Also, the diaspora population are said to constitute not only *critical criminal groups* especially in the areas of human and drug trafficking, but also constitute *threats to the economies of their host countries*. As noted by [17], 63 per cent of the extrajudicial killings were carried out by the police. This submission is corroborated by the survey conducted by [3] of municipal police trainees and officers in the City of Johannesburg which:

....showed that 30% of the municipal police officers surveyed believed that 'foreigners cause crime'. Another 23% felt that 'overcrowding' (due to urbanisation into Johannesburg) caused crime. The survey also showed that municipal police officers had a very poor understanding of the different kinds of foreigners described in South African legislation e.g. migrant workers, refugees or undocumented migrants. As municipal police officers take on extended policing functions, their attitudes towards non-nationals and knowledge of the relevant legislation becomes increasingly important; as they will also be responsible for ensuring the safety of migrant communities.

Misperceptions about the amount of migration into South Africa are reinforced by the belief of some top government functionaries that immigrants are poor and unskilled and therefore compete with South Africans for scarce public resources such as work, health care etc. this supposition is substantiated by the occasional comments of High-ranking government officials and politicians who have, at times, fuelled xenophobic views that portray refugees and other migrants as burdens on the state. For example, the Minister of Home Affairs stated in 1994 that: If South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with the millions of 'aliens' that are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme [18]. Also, The Minister of Home Affairs stated in 1998 that there were between 2.5 and 5 million illegal 'aliens' in South Africa which were costing the State "billions of Rand per year" [18].

A database compiled by Duncan Breen in 2010 at the Consortium for Refugees and migrants in South Africa records a large number of attacks in Cape Town since 2008, which include:

....the eviction of five Somali shops in Valhalla park; the killing of a Somali shopkeeper in Fisantekraal; the killing of one and injury of three foreigners in Delft; the attack of a Burundian national by police in the Cape Town CBD and the murder of a Malawian national. A database compiled by Breen in 2013 reveals the killing of two Somali nationals in SamoraMachel and the killing of two Somali traders in Wynberg and Mitchell's Plain respectively, by local traders.

The Implications of the Xenophobic Attacks on Nigerians in South Africa:

With respect to Nigeria alone, it was recorded that not less than 20 Nigerians had been killed in xenophobic attacks against foreigners in South Africa on January 2, 2017; while about 96 Nigerians were killed in 2015. Dabiri-Erewa complained that over 116 Nigerians were killed within two years in South Africa. Among those killed are IkejiakuChinedu, Christian Onwukaike, Monday Okorie, Gideon Ogalaonye, Nnamdi Michael, AdeniyiOlumoko, TochikwuNnadi. Within the period of attacks, Nigerian Diaspora lost their economic assets worth of 4.6 million Rand or N90 million [17]. The Nigerian community in South Africa, led by IkechukwuAnyene, has confirmed the attacks and looting of Nigerian-owned businesses in Pretoria West. She quoted Anyene as saying that the union had reported the incident to the Nigeria mission and South African police. [17] noted that *"....five buildings with Nigerian businesses, including a church, have been looted and burned by South Africans"*. The implications of the xenophobic attacks on Nigerians in South Africa include that:

- Nigerians precisely are no longer safe in South Africa because they have become targets of attacks;
- The economic assets of the Nigerian Diaspora in South Africa are no longer secure for Nigerians;

In a situation where the lives and property of Nigerians can no longer be guaranteed under State Responsibility to protect on the sides of both Nigeria and South Africa, it means that they are completely criminalized and under threats.

Diplomatic Imperatives for Addressing the Xenophobic Attacks on Nigerians in South Africa:

The xenophobic attacks against diaspora population in South Africa have some diplomatic imperatives not just for Nigeria but for the entire black race which constitute the targets of the attacks. The "African Foreigners" in South Africa are

mainly drawn from Nigeria, Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe. These countries have in one way or the other contributed immensely to the freedom of South Africa from Apartheid Rule. For instances:

- Nigeria set up the National Committee Against Apartheid (NACAP) in 1960.
- The late Sunny Okosun composed a song called "Fire in Soweto" in 1977 to show support for the fight against apartheid
- From 1966, Nigeria gave material and financial support to the freedom fighters in South Africa
- Then Nigeria's Prime Minister, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa sent letter to South Africa's ANC militants on April 4, 1961 showing support for their cause.
- Nigeria provided \$5 million to the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) annually.
- In 1976, Nigeria set up the Southern Africa Relief Fund (SAFR) for the purpose of bringing relief materials to the victims of the apartheid
- The military administration of General Obasanjo contributed \$3.7 million to the fund and Obasanjo personally donated \$3, 000 to the fund.
- All Nigeria's civil servants and public officers made a 2% donation from their monthly salary to the SAFR.
- Nigerian students skipped their lunch to make donations and by June 1977, the total contribution to the fund had reached \$10.5 million. The donations to the SAFR were widely known in Nigeria as the "Mandela tax"
- Between 1973 and 1978, Nigeria contributed \$39, 040 to the UN Educational and Training Programme for South Africa
- Nigeria boycotted the 1976 Olympics and Commonwealth games in 1979 as part of our protest against apartheid in South Africa
- From 1960 to 1995, Nigeria spent over \$61 billion to support the end of apartheid, more than any other country in the world.
- Nigeria refused to sell oil to South Africa in protest against the white minority rule. Nigeria lost approximately \$41 billion then.
- The Nigerian government issued more than 300 passports to South Africans seeking to travel abroad.

Following the end of apartheid in 1994, South African businesses sought for professionals to immigrate and a large number of Nigerians did so. It is estimated that

there were 24, 000 Nigerians living in South Africa in 2011. It was expected that all these sacrifices by Nigeria for South Africa would be reciprocated. But Much of South Africa's good will towards Nigerians for supporting the ANC during apartheid has allegedly disappeared due to the activities of Nigerian organized crime in the country which was said grew rapidly between 1994 and 1998.

In line with the foregoing expositions, addressing the xenophobic attacks in South Africa requires some diplomatic actions on the sides of both South Africa and the affected countries. These diplomatic actions may include but not limited to the following:

- Diplomatic dialogue between the High Commissions/Embassies of South Africa, Nigeria and other Countries.
- Institutionalized historical re-orientation of South Africa Citizens to continually inform them of the roles played by Africans and African Countries in the Apartheid Struggle; this will enable them see reasons why they should be more accommodating even when their national leaders tend to behave otherwise.
- Application of diplomatic reciprocity if dialogue fails; it is evident that where a country has the political clout, diplomatic retaliations largely helps in normalizing relations among state because punished actions are scarcely repeated or continues, but unpunished actions tend to be repeated and continued.
- Peaceful Economic Diplomatic Protest; in a country like Nigeria where South Africa has significant economic investment like the "MTN", "Call-Message-Protest" can be facilitated. If Nigerians at home can decline from using their "MTN" line to make call and send messages for one day or one week, the revenue that will be lost can sufficiently compel the government of both countries to address the issues squarely.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The xenophobic attacks in South Africa is seen to have been limited to African non-nationals and even some South Africans who cannot speak the Zulu language or have little variations in their skin colour. Many of the xenophobic vanguards are not aware of or have decided to ignore, the various contributions of the national governments of the different countries they attack their citizens in the war against apartheid in South Africa; hence, they pay back evil for good. The xenophobic

attacks which took various forms like *Eviction, beating, incarceration, killing* of the Diaspora population as well as *looting and burning of shops and institutions* are backed by some traditional, local and national political authorities who either pretend that there is nothing like xenophobia, make xenophobic statements, or even mobilize and participate actively. The causes of the xenophobic attacks revolve around the fear that foreigners are taking over their jobs and social amenities at their expense; jealousy over foreigners' business prosperity; and perception of foreigners as sources of crimes. The implication is that neither the security of the diaspora population, nor their investment in South Africa is guaranteed especially given that the government leaders often play supportive roles in favour of the attacks. Consequently, some serious diplomatic actions centred on "Citizen Diplomacy" by both South Africa and the concerned country are recommended to address the situation; these include but not limited to diplomatic dialogue, institutionalized re-orientation of the South African Citizens/xenophobic attackers; application of the doctrine of diplomatic reciprocity when necessary; and economic diplomatic protests.

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