

Israel-Palestinian Conflict and the Jihadist Radicalization in North Africa

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Abstract: The intractable nature of the Israel / Palestinian conflict has assumed greater impetus by Jihadist radicalization in North Africa. By this religious inclination and movement, the high stake issues of land, culture and livelihood have been aggravated, thereby prolonging resolution. This paper traced the history and political implications of the conflict to world peace and international relations. We adopted the intractable conflict theory. We discovered that as long as the parties continue to lay claim on high stake issues of land, culture and religion the end of the will be prolonged. The current violent campaign launched in North Africa is also an extension of the Middle East conflict.

Key words: Intractable • Conflict • Israel • Paletinian • Radicalisation and North Africa

INTRODUCTION

There has been a rising concern on the intractability of the Israel - Palestinian conflict and invariably how the conflict has fueled the rise of transnational Jihadism in North Africa. Notably, the consequence of the six Day war (1967) most especially the conquest of Jerusalem and territories of Greater Israel which precipitated a messianic movement among religious Zionist Jews in Israel. Sequel to this, the first Intifada (1987) turned Hamas, which had represented a social Islamic trend, into a political movement. The settlement ideology of religious Zionism has been reinforced in recent years through the support of the Shas movement and various Ultra-Orthodox and Hasidic groups and individuals. On the Palestinian side, Hamas has achieved a status of influence owing to the victory recorded in the 2006 elections and control of the Gaza strip. Being a religious movement, Hamas views the problem of Palestinian as a religious problem and the conflict with Israel as a religious conflict in two ways: the sanctity of Jerusalem, which graces all Palestine and the image of the Jew as inherently evil.

Fundamentally, studies have revealed the increasing growth of the Hamas-Al-Qaida relationship. In the words of Thomas and [1], the Palestinian militants and transnational Jihadists are not in two different worlds. They have kept a close eye on and learned from one another over the Years. Al-Qaida, for instance, adopted some of Hama's tactics notably suicide bombings and the

practice of recording martyrdom videos observing them from afar in the 1990s. Mutual sympathies and respect also exist, for example, many Hamas supporters are fiercely anti American and have expressed respect for Osama bin Laden, although this has not translated into military operations against western targets.

Essentially, the political discourse on both sides of the Israel-Palestinian conflict is infused with religious symbols and values that incorporate the sanctity of the land, the religious and commandment to control and settle on it, the holy sites and the war. The status and sanctity of the territory in dispute involving Israel - Palestinian land including Jerusalem add a significant religious-cultural aspect to the national conflicts. Moreover, the actions of Israeli settlers such as Gush Emunim, "bloc of faithful" who are motivated by fundamentalist Jewish ideology [2] and whose activities the governments of Israel have supported, or at least not taken any significant steps to prevent for over four decades also create the impression that the religious aspect (Jewish, in this case) is a central element of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and poses an obstacle to the achievement of compromise and solution.

The Role of Religion in the Escalation of the Israel Palestinian Conflict: Basically, it is a truism that Judaism and Islamism have three central elements of religious faith that represent conflicting values and are therefore used in specific context to reinforce the religious aspect of the

Israel-Palestinian conflict. The first in the opinion of [3] are the laws of war and Peace, primarily regarding the question of whether it is permissible to settle a conflict through compromise with members of another religion. The second is related to the status of the territory of Israel/Palestinian land and the question of whether control over it must be exclusive or may be shared with members of another nation and religion. The third element is related to the status of Jerusalem and the question of whether any rights may be granted to members of the other religion at this holy site in this holy city Yitzhak (ND).

In the holy writings of the monotheistic religious and religious faiths generally, one can often find internal contradiction. The laws of war in the Quran are quite reminiscent of the biblical laws of war (Deuteronomy 20:10).

The Torah commands the people of Israel to “blot out the remembrance of Amalea” in the cruelest way possible (Deuteronomy 25:17) and to fight the seven people that were in the land in order to attain full control. On the other hand, one can cite the Bible regarding the Vision of Peace of Isaiah 5:15). The question of which of these two approaches will be accepted by religious scholars depends on the historical context and outlook. Yitzhak (ND) presented the opinion of three rabbis, ruling on matters of state, who have opposing opinions regarding resolution of the conflict and territorial compromise. When Rabbi Amos Sharki, who belongs to the national-religious movement, was asked whether we have a religious duty to defend the state of Israel from enemies that surround it and to recapture Gaza and Sinai, he replied, “There is a religious duty to conquer all of greater Israel Rabbi Eliezer Melamed, former head of the Hesder Yeshiva (school for religious study in, combination with army service in Har Bracha)which was at the centre of a public controversy in December 2009, after calling on his students and soldiers to refuse orders to assist evacuating illegal Jewish outpost-settlements) addressed the question of a possible compromise and wrote “in any concession, however small, to the enemy, there is a great danger that the power of deterrence will be undermined”

Melamed interprets the verse “They shall not dwell in the land “(Exodus 25:33) as an obligation to expel the Arabs from the land. He is certain that any agreement (with the Palestinian) based on uprooting Jews from their homes is prohibited. According to him, withdrawal from the (Palestinian-Populated) territories is akin to desecrating the name of the lord, forbidden under any circumstances even at the cost of one’s life, because the Arabs are waging a religious war against Israel (a war by

those who hate us against our religion) Regarding the validity of a government decision on withdrawal from the territories. Melamed is certain that decision of the government and Knesset are obligatory only with respect to matters of tax payments, traffic regulations, construction and trade but not with respect to laws that conflict with the Torah (Melamed, undated). [4] ,provides an interpretation that goes even further and sees the Palestinians as Amalekites who must be uprooted. In contrast, there are rabbis who support compromise on the grounds of the religious duty to save lives, fear of war, moral reasons, or so as not to provoke the goyim’ (gentiles), Rabi Yehvda Amital, one of the founders of the political party Meimad, supported territorial compromise [5].

Classical Islam as noted by Yatzhak (ND) a reminiscent of the biblical position, although it differs in geographical scope and the intensity of its calls for war against nations that adhere to other faiths. Surah of the Quran has two consecutive Verses, 60 and 61, the first which calls for war and the second which says to reach out in peace. In the words of [6],Islam does not specifically address a defined territory as Judaism does with the “promised land”. Rather, it calls for spreading the religion throughout the world by war, among other means. The classic Islamic doctrine holds that Islam is a political entity that is constantly expanding and does not legitimize coexistence with non-Muslim communities unless they accept its protection [7].

At the time of Islam expansion, legal scholars at Islam defined the non-Muslim world as “the abode of war” (dar al-harb), that is, a region that Muslims who belong to “the abode of Islam” (dar al-Islam) should fight in order to bring them under the rule of Islam, after first calling on the infidels to convert to Islam and, if they do not acquiesce, to convert them by force by the sword. It should be emphasized that this division of the world into two is the interpretation of legal scholars from the early medieval times and does not appear in the Quran or hadith. Despite this the Hamas charter (Article 15) defined Palestine as part of dar al-Islam that must be liberated through “defensive jihad.” The classic doctrine of jihad holds that war is an ongoing means that may only be temporally suspended for purposes of reinforcement towards resumption of fighting when possible. It follows that the Islamic entity cannot a priori agree to a non-belligerence or an agreement not to engage in war may only be of a temporary nature and only in circumstances of inferior strength in relation to the enemy camp. If the Muslim rulers conclude that a quick victory over enemies is not achievable, then he may for the purpose of enabling the

Muslim to gather strength-and renew the jihad later, pursue an agreement with the infidels not to attack [8]. The answer to the question of when to fight and when to strike a ceasefire or peace agreement is a matter of interpretation and here too there is a dichotomy between two schools of thought: a radical trend and a pragmatic trend. Commentators from the radical trend support the use of military force and “resistance” in the name of “liberation” of Palestine political approaches does not work. Pragmatic commentators rely on historical precedents in which compromise agreements with far-reaching implications were forged with enemies of Islam [9].

The preamble to the Hamas Charter Quotes Sheikh Hassan Al-Banna a founder of the Muslim Brotherhood: “Israel will rise and will remain erect until Islam eliminates it as it had eliminated its predecessors. On the other side is sheikh Jamal Al-Bawatneh who was the Palestinian Mufti in 2005 was later appointed to the position of Palestinian Authority Minister of the west when asked whether it was permissible to disrupt Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza strip in 2005 through acts of violence or to conduct negotiations over Palestinian territories, his response was, “Although all of Palestine is Waqf land, it is permissible to liberate Palestine by negotiations as well.” He added that, “The president of the Palestinian Authority should be respected” [10]. The historical narrative of most Palestinians see the Jews as a foreign implant in a land that was always Arab-owned [11]. In addition, jihad and Islam had (sacrifice of life) serve Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as Fatah groups at times, in their confrontation with Israel.

Jihadist Radicalization and Assassination on Religious Ground in the Israel/palestinian Conflict: Religious-extremists can frustrate political negotiation and compromise processes by means of provocation and terrorism as well as, in extreme cases, political assassination. The salient examples of political assassination on religious and ideological grounds in the context of political compromise are the assassinations of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 by a religious manifesto [12] and the assassination of Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 by an orthodox religious man operating on the basis of a religious decree (the law of the pursuer), permitting extrajudicial killings provided to him by Rabbis [13-15].

Political assassination based on religious values is liable to repeat itself. In March 2008 Rabbi Hershel Schachter, head of the rabbinical seminary at Yeshiva University in New York, was quoted as saying, “if the

government of Israel indeed concedes Jerusalem, then the prime minister should be shot.” After the publication at these words, Rabbi Schechter issued an apology and expressed regret for statement [16]. In early 2010, Ehud Barak, then defense minister in Netanyahu’s government, received letters with death threats following his strict enforcement of a freeze on settlement construction in Judea and Samaria. In recent years it was revealed that Hamas had intended to assassinate the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, using a booby-trapped tunnel that had been dug under the route of his commute.

The second type of violence used to undermine, political negotiation is terrorism motivated by religious ideology and in particular, attacks on sacred symbols of identity and holy sites. Examples include the following: Many actions of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, including the murder of Hebron Yeshiva students as they were existing from prayers (1980) and a murderous assault on the Mercaz HaRav Yeshivas in Jerusalem in 2008, the Jewish underground’s plan to blow up the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque in the 1980s, (which received the authorization of three rabbis) the attack on the Islamic College in Hebron in 1986 and the murder of worshippers at the Ibrahim College in Hebron in 1986 and the murder of worshippers at the Ibrahim Mosque (the muslim site within the care of the patriarchs) in Hebron in February 1994. These acts intensify hostility towards the other side among moderates as well and that is the source of their negative effect on resolution of the conflict [17].

Religious leaders also intervene with the political process through the indoctrination of military forces. The Palestinians use the defense of Al-Aqsa as an inalienable asset of Fatah, not only of the Islamic movements [18].

Transitional Jihad Ideologues of Palestinian Origin: In analyzing a sensitive critical issue of this nature, the fundamental question that occupies the mind is whether the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has fuelled transitional jihadism by producing activities, predisposed due to their exile and sense of grievance to transnational militancy. The Israel scholar of jihadism, Reuven Paz, noted in 2002 that Palestinians appear to be overrepresented among ideologues associated with transnational forms of Islamism. Paz did not elaborate on the causal mechanism behind this overrepresentation, but listed a number of Palestinian ideologues of note, from Tagi al-Din al-Nabhani (the founder of Hizb al-Tahrir) via Abdullah Assam (the leader of of the Arab -Afghan movement) to Abu Qatada al-Philistine (the formally UK-based radical preacher) [19].

More recently, the Lebanese journalist Hazim al-Amin has presented a more elaborate explanation for this phenomenon. In a book entitled "The Orphaned Salafi: The Palestinian Face of Global Jihad and al-Qaida (2011), he argued that statelessness and exile led many Palestinian Islamists in the Diaspora to focus on issues greater than national liberation. The Palestinian-Jordanian author Marwan Shahada has made a similar argument though in less depth.

There is much anecdotal evidence to support this postulation. a good example is the diary of the former al-Qaida Felicitator zany al-Nidin Muhammad Husain (Abu Zubayda), a Palestinian who grew up in Sandi Arabia [20]. In 1990 before radicalizing, he wrote "I am a Palestinian, with no homeland, no passport and no identity, while the jews are running loose in my country", Abu Zubayela was forced to attend university in India because only Saudi nationals were allowed to study computer science (his preferred subject) in the kingdom. Only after arriving in India did he decide to explore jihad, training camps in Peshawar, Pakistan.

Essentially, exile has made Palestinians predisposed to transnational activism. It is perhaps useful to start by surveying some of the available quantitative evidence on the presence of Palestinians in the world of transnational jihadism. The internationalization of Palestine as an Islamic cause that Islamists all over the world claim as their own is of more recent date, although its origins can perhaps be found in the pan-Islamic actions of Hdjj amin al-Husayni dating back to 1931. To understand this international Islamisation of the Palestinian question from the 1970, onwards coinciding with the Middle Eastern rise of Islamism in general, [7]. Two trends need to be taken into account; the spread of salafism and the war in Afghanistan (1979-1980).

The rise of salafism, often seen by both its adherents and uniformed outsiders as pure and unadulterated form of Islam, coincided with the rise of Islamism as a whole since the Arab loss in 1976. Salafism can be defined as the branch of Sunni Islam whose adherents try to emulate the pious predecessors (al-salaf al-salih), hence the name salafism especially the first three generations of Muslim, as strictly and in as many spheres of life as possible. [21]. It is much more scriptural and uncompromising trend than the relatively accommodating and doctrinally, pragmatic Muslim Brotherhood and has different historical, theological and political roots. Perhaps partly because of its image as pure and devoid of cultural innovations (bida), salafism spread across the Muslim world, abetted by the writing of important mediaeval salafi scholars such as Ibn Tayniyya (1262-1328), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350) and Ibu kathir (1300-1373)[22]. A major factor

in the promotion of salafism was Saudi propaganda from 1960s onwards, spreading a message of strict, yet regime-friendly salafism to counter Nasser's socialist rhetoric and, after 1979, the Shiite discourse of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. This process was stimulated even further by migrant workers in the Gulf regime who often adopted Salafi customs there before returning to their home countries more conservative and more pious than they had been before.

[8] observed that the spread of this interventionist and much more salafi form of Islamism championed by al-Qaida has not left Palestinian in the occupied territories. Salafism of peaceful and apolitical kind in the West Bank can be traced back to the 1970s and is related to Saudi efforts to counter the radical Shiite rhetoric coming from Iran after the Islamic Revolution took place there in 1979. The activities of such Palestinian salafis have focused on studying pure" Islam, education and missionary activities. Similar salafi groups exist in the Gaza strip, where their activities started even before the Islamic Revolution, partly as a result of scholars returning from their studies in Saudi Arabia, but whose ideological focus is generally the same as that of their west Bank brethren. Issues such as the fight against Israel and the liberation of Palestine, which should be avoided [5].

In their recent study, [3] observed that while most Palestinian salafis do not fight the powers that be and focus on missionary activities instead, the past few years have witnessed the emergence of a radical salafi minority that espouses a message that is much more akin to what al-Qaida, stands for and engages in different types of violence. Although some of these groups seem to be rather tribal in nature without a coherent ideology, others are clearly Salafi in nature. In the Gaza strip, groups such as Jund Ansar alah and the Jama at al-Tawhid wa-l- jihad are the most prominent of a large cluster of small like-minded "organizations" that seem to have come into existence through frustration over Hamas's supposedly compromised and watered-down jihad against Israel on the one hand and a susceptibility to the "purity" of the salafi message particularly that of al-Qaida on the other. It is therefore not surprising that these groups pair a salafi outlook with military activities against Israel. While such attacks are mostly rockets fired at Israel towns like Sderot are Perhaps ideologically supported by Hamas, their activities may not always fit the latter's agenda of waiting to keep quiet in the Gaza strip or maintaining a cease-fire with Israel [7]. For this reason and others, Hamas has clashed with such radical salafi organizations and has tried to suppress them, even going so far as killing some of their members.

The Sanctity of the Land of Great Israel/palestine and the Escalation of Jihadist Radicalization: In a study carried out by [23], they observed that a wide-spread theological outlook among Israeli Jews and Palestinian Muslims holds that the entire land of Israel Palestine is a holy land the “promised land” for one side waqt (pious endowment) for the other and therefore religions faith forbids conceding any control over the land from a Jewish perspective, it is even a religious duty to settle in all parts of the land. The concept of the holiness of the land in its entirety derives from two parallel processes; a traditional one and a modern one. The traditional process is based on a conservative reading of holy writings. Corroborating this, Yitzhak (ND) noted that the modern process is related to the formulation of the right of self-determination in sacred national territory, a formulation that encourages willingness to sacrifice in order to defend the land.

Israel has identified the way in which territory comes to be defined as holy factors in the formulation of nationalism in the modern era, looking at this process as it has taken shape primarily in Europe and in its transition to a perspective that God granted the national “land to the people or nation” [8]. The national land is sanctified through the religion or history of the people and is intertwined with the history of the adherents of this religion. In the land of Israel Palestine, the conflict is over territory that was the cradle of Judaism and Christianity and has great significance for Sunni Islam. At least since the crusader period, the land has been known as the “Holy Land” or Terra Sancta”.

In present-day religious interpretive discourse religious and political actors and commentators on Jewish halacha and Muslim sharia are influenced by the modern discourse and incorporate the modern concept of “sovereignty” [9]. As in the matter of religious war, there is the need to employ conservative-radical and pragmatic approaches on both sides regarding all aspects of the question of sanctity of the territory in dispute on the land of Israel/Palestine.

Islamism has highly escalated jihadist radicalization as the radical Palestinian interpretation regards all the land of Israel Palestine as holy [19]. The Hamas Charter asserts the sanctity of the entire land of Palestine because it was conquered by the prophet Muhammad’s followers, who gave their lives in the process. These lands, from the moment they were captured by the Muslim army, became Muslim lands. After being conquered by foreigners they must be liberated through jihad and it is the personal duty of every Muslim everywhere to act, towards this end. Furthermore, the Holy Land contains holy sites, foremost among them the Al-Aqsa mosque which is connected to

the sacred mosque in Mecca by way of the prophet Muhammad’s Night journey (Quran 17: cited [9]. Article 11 of the Hamas charter of 1988 holds that all of Palestine is holy waqf land that Allah granted to his believers and no one has the authority to concede it or any part of it. Has augment noted by [12] is an invention that relies on a wrong interpretation of sources.

On the day that Yasser Arafat rejected U.S president Bill Clinton’s proposal, during camp David peace talk (22, July 2000), the Palestinian Grad Mufti Sheikh Ikrima Sabri issued a religious decree (fatwa) according to which it is forbidden for Muslims in Palestine to accept compensation in exchange for land conquered by the Zionists for the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. The decree states, “Acceptance of compensation for Palestine lands is Akin to the selling of land and both are completely prohibited by the sharia” [17]. Anyone who receives compensation for his property is subject to the fatwa of the ulama (sages) of Palestine from the 1930s, which utterly prohibits this because the lands of Palestine, are not a commodity to be exchanged, but holy and blessed Waqf land Sabri relived on a fatwa from 1995 signed by 249 Ulama, including muftis, gadis/judges) and other officials of Palestine, according to which, this holy land are the first qibla (direction of prayer), the third mosque, the destination of isra and the mi raj (the prophet Muhammad ‘s night time journey to the Al- Aqsa Mosque as per the Quran 17:1 and the story of his ascent to Heaved) of your prophet and the earth that is drenched with the Blood of righteous Muslim warriors and the prophets, holy men, martyrs and righteous forefathers and every step of these lands embodies all the glorified holy endowment deeds that survived over the generations and they are what determine the Islamic nature of the land for there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger [14]. The Holy Land, which embodies all the glorified holy endowment deeds that survived over the generations and they are what determine the Islamic nature of the Land which embodies all of the above is the deposit (Amana) of Allah and his messenger and entails a duty for all Muslims and its significance is extinguishment of the light that shines from the holy Land and in addition such a sale promoted the expulsion of Muslims from their lands. An additional fatwa directed against land speculators defined the whole territory of Palestine as a holy Islamic land [16]. In issuing this fatwa, the Mufti Sabri sought to confront the Islamic opposition within Hamas leadership and prevent it from claiming that the Fatah/PLO were trading in Palestinian lands but had consciously or subconsciously adopted and spread the Hamas perspectives [11].

The Holy Sites of Jerusalem and for Most among Them- the Temple Mount/al Haram Alshariff: The old city of Jerusalem, particularly site of the Temple Mount/Al-Haram Al-sharif (or as it is frequently termed these days the Al- Aqsa compound, as well as holy sites outside of Jerusalem, such as Rachel's tomb, Joseph's tomb in Nablus and the cave of the Macphela/Al-Masjid Al-Ibrahimi (burial site of Abraham, Israel, Jacob, Sara, Rebecca and Leah), are anchors for the national-religious and historical identity of a vast population, which includes people who are not necessarily religious or observant [13]. The February 2010 decision of the Netanyahu government to include Rachel's tomb and the cave of the Machpela among heritage sites intended for development led to an outbreak of violence and the threat of a religious war on the part of Palestinian leaders. This serves as a practical example of the highly charged nature of holy sites as symbols of religion and nationality. The old city and the Temple Mount are perceived on both sides of the Israel-Palestinian conflict as a protected, value over which each side exclusively, although Israel representatives did agree to relinquish sovereignty over the Temple Mount at the Boiling talks [8]. The proposed compromises being presented these days are suspension of sovereignty, transfer of authority to a third party and international oversight. The cognitive charges taking place over the course of the last generation on both sides of the conflict are further Polarizing the parties positions on Jerusalem and the holy sites, making the search for a compromise that would be acceptable to the leaders and general public, including the religious and traditional, very difficult.

The first cognitive process taking place on both sides is the formation of a historical ethos that presents control of Jerusalem and the holy sites as a historical right of the national religious people and as part of its identity. Jews regard Jerusalem in the context of Mount Moriah, site of the near-sacrifice of Isaac, which is associated with the site of the Temple. According to the biblical narrative, king David bought this place, from the Jebusites, over 3,000 years ago and made it the capital of his kingdom. [16]. For Jews Jerusalem, is the place of residence of the Shekina (presence of God) within the first and second Temples, which were the successive centers of Jewish ritual for approximately 1,000 years and are therefore, also the focal point of Jewish experiences. The destruction of the Temple on the ninth day, of the month of AV has since been a national trauma and a day of fasting. From the perspectives of Israeli Jews, one of the names Jerusalem-Zion is one the source of inspiration for

Zionism and for the concept of "Return to Zion" a concept that is stressed in Jewish liturgy [3].

[18] in his studies observed that the Muslim Arabs associate the antiquity of the Al-Aqsa Mosque with the creation of the world and assert a 5000 –year Arab link to Jerusalem, based on the claim that the Jebuites and Canaanites were early Arab tribes. In his view, Jerusalem is the first direction of prayer within Islam, the desired destination of the prophet during his Night Journey mentioned in the Quran 17:1 and the place from which the prophet ascended to heaven, according to Muslim tradition. From the Palestinian perspective, Al-Quds (the holy - Jerusalem) symbolizes the holiness of the entire land because the surrounding of Al-Aqsa mosques were blessed by Allah.

The traditional story regarding Muhammad's journey holds that the angel Gabriel tied his magical house, Al-Auraq, to the entrance of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which Muslims today identify as the site of the western wall. As a consequence, Palestinian Muslims argue that the western wall, which is also a wall of the al-Aqsa site, is holy to Muslims [23]. In addition, the grounds (plaza) of the western wall are waqf property (consecrated by the 14th century Maghreb pilgrim Abu Midyan al-Ghawt). According to the Muslims, the Islamic charter of Jerusalem derives from a continuous 1,400-year political rule over Al-Quads (excepting, 90 years of crusader rule, between 1099 and 1187), as evidenced by some 1,000 monuments, institutions and holy sites created by caliphs, sultans and Muslim rulers of the city [5].

The second cognitive process, a product about Jerusalem by both parties to the conflict, is denial by religious Muslims and many others of the historical link of Jews to the Temple Mount, the western wall and the city in general and on the Jewish side, non-recognition of the importance of Jerusalem to Muslims prior to the emergence of Zionism [5].

The third cognitive process taking place is the widespread public acceptance of the national religious ethos and its dissemination among the general public since June 1967. On the Jewish-Israel side, the Ninth of Av represents the destruction of the Temple and is an optional holiday on the official Israeli work calendar, a day that has increasingly become a chosen holiday among public workplaces. In 1968, the chief Rabbinate decided to mark the 28th of Iyar as a holiday "Jerusalem Day" as did the Knesset, which passed a special law in this regard in 1988. The government of Israel and Municipality of Jerusalem Day celebrations a national event. since the Oslo Accord, more and more rabbis who believe in Greater

Israel have permitted entrance to the site of the temple Mount or rituals around in demonstration of the Jews' strong attachment to the site, in contrast to the position of the chief Rabbinate in 1967. These activities have increased in recent years [6, 8, 11].

On the Palestinian-Muslim side, the setting of a fire in Al-Aqsa Mosque in August 1969 by a messianic , Christian Australian generated the claim that Al-Aqsa is in danger" because it is held captive by the Zionists and must be liberated through Jihad [4]. Massive numbers of Muslims visited the Al-Aqsa compound during the month of Ramadan in the 1990s (approximately 400,000 people, according to police reports/because of political motives as well as religious belief in the power of prayer at Al-Aqsa., Since the eruption of the Al-Aqsa intifada, however, entry to the site has been restricted for security reasons, with admittance based on the criteria of age and place of residence. Today the Muslim world is engaged in an intensive discursive and symbolic political ritual surrounding Al-Aqsa and Al-Quds, expressed through special gatherings. Under the, heading "Al-Quds Day or "Al-Aqsa week" many mosques throughout the world offer special sermon, thereby infused the public discourse with an array of writings and speeches. These generate a ritual of administration and sanctification, blurring the lines between the realms of politics and religion [11].

[5] in his own opinion noted that the three cognitive processes cause large sector of the population on both sides, including the secular and traditional, to develop unyielding, inflexible attitudes regarding all aspects of the future of Jerusalem's old city and holy sites. Religious value has permeated the non religions public and have been marketed as a contemporary national ethos, shaping public opinion on every matter relating to negotiation and compromise. This for example, after Yasser Arafat denied that the Temple had actually been in Jerusalem during the second camp David summit (July 2000) a public opinion survey showed that only 9% of Jews were willing to agree to exclusive Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount /Al-Haram al-Sharif whereas 51% supported Israeli sovereignty. This was despite the Israeli government's recognition, in June 1967, of Wagf control over the Haram (with certain restrictions). The issues surrounding this holy site were among the principal factors that led to the failure of the second Camp David talks [8]. Positions on the Palestinian side are even more inflexible. For example, while Yasser Arafat was conducting peace talk at camp David in July 2000, Palestinian mufti Ikrima Sabri, who had been appointed by Arafat, wrote "there is no room for

compromise on our right to Jerusalem because our presence there is a decision of God, not a human decision. a survey of the International peace institute, headed by Jerje Larsen and assisted by a Palestinian research centre, found that 52% of Palestinians in the west Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza strip opposed a solution to the problem of Jerusalem that would be based on the principle of "Arab neighborhoods for Arabs and Jewish neighborhoods for Jews.

uncompromising positions on the part of Israelis and Palestinians regarding holy sites reinforced the arguments of social and political psychology researches who claim that holy sites such as those in Jerusalem are "protected" or "sacred vlues" not subject to concession, negotiation, compromise or exchange [5, 7, 8].

The centrality of the Temple Mount/ Al-Haram Al-Sharif as a symbol of identity served to increase awareness-among those savoring an end to the conflict that a possible compromise depends on relinquishing sovereignty and exchanging it for a special regime involving international oversight in the heart of the old city of Jerusalem [9]. Alternatively, division of the old city so that the western wall and Jewish Quarter, remain under Israeli control while the Temple Mount and other parts of the old city, with the possible exception of the Armenian Quarter come under Palestinian control [12].

CONCLUSION

Having explored pertinent issues that necessitated this study, it is clear that Jihadist radicalization in the North African has increased substantially and particularly in Palestine owing to its link with the Al-Qaida and Salafi network. The implication of this is that the process of conflict resolution in the Israel/ Palestinian conflict continue to be interrupted by religious values and ideologies thereby preventing the possible resolution of the conflict through peace and compromise.

We hereby advocate a practice and strict enforcement of the laws against the use of religious texts and values for the purpose of inciting violence. The imprisonment of Sheikh Raid Salah (Head of the Northern Islamic Movement) in Israel in 2010 for activities carried out in 2007 in the Mughrebi Ramb incident is an example of measures that governments can take against clergies who incite the public, he was sentenced to nine months imprisonment following his trail. If those with the power to enforce the law, would take action to prosecute clergy who inflame the public and if every indictment were accompanied by an expert opinion explaining how

extremist statement provide a near certainty of violence and bloodshed, then there would be a high likelihood of instigators being found guilty and acceptable for their deeds.

It is a truism that religious fanaticism on the part of individuals and groups can aggravate conflict and escalate violence. Likewise, sensationalist terrorist acts found on symbols of religion and identity, as well as political assassinations of moderate leaders by ideological religious extremists can delay negotiations and frustrate compromise.

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