

Indigenous Factors Responsible for the Rise of Militancy in FATA

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Abstract: Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), are under international spotlight, but unfortunately not for good reasons. FATA is being considered as a “hub” of international terrorism, which is not only threatening the peace of Pakistan and Afghanistan, but that of the whole world. Many militant organizations, ranging from small and comparatively unknown i.e., the Asian Tigers to bigger and umbrella organizations like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and even bigger and well organized like Al-Qaeda and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) are operating in the area. There are many studies available on the rising tide of militancy in the tribal areas, but is being missing is the theoretical understanding of militancy and this paper will fulfill that gap. Furthermore, the primary causes of militancy have been delineated from the “risk factors”. Like wise, the paper will try to address some of the pertinent questions related to FATA. The Questions are: how FATA is characterized by local and international readers keeping its location, people and the prevailing laws, etc in mind? What are the indigenous factors involved in the rise of militancy in the tribal areas of Pakistan? How militancy took its roots and got accelerated in FATA? What are the contexts and dynamics of militancy in each administrative agency of FATA? Let us look and figure out academic answers to the above these questions.

Key words: Militancy • Jirga • FCR • FATA • Pakhtuns • Taliban

INTRODUCTION

The History Context: Historically, the region had been subjected to series of invasion, but was never fully tamed. The written record dates back to the conquest of Alexander the great, in 323 B.C, followed by the reign of Ashok that lasted until 250 B.C. In the 9th and 10th century AD, the areas saw the conquest from central Asian Muslim Rajojaypal, a Hindu Rajput was defeated by Mehmud Ghaznavi in Peshawar. He run his empire between 1000 and 1026 AD but never consolidated India. Changiz Khan came in 1212 A.D. followed by Amir Timur (Tamerlane). Then, in 1926, the Mughal conquered the area. The areas were under Afghans, when Ahmad Shah Baba, conquered all these areas up to Kashmir from Oxus in the North. Then, came the brief period of Sikhs- from 1823-1849 and they were defeated by Britain. The Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842) was a major set back for the British. The second Anglo-Afghan War was also a “fiasco” for the British in Afghanistan, but what they got was strategically very important. The British authorities took control of the Khyber, Kurram and Bolan passes.

The area, now known as FATA, was once part of the imperial struggle, also known as the Great Game, between Britain and Czarist Russia in the 19th century. For Britain, the effective control of the region was important for its “jewel in the crown” i.e. India and to stop Russian influence in Central Asia. For Russia, the reason was important to keep Britain at bay from its (Russia’s) “near-abroad”.

What is important to note in the British era is that the areas, now FATA, were a constant source of instability. In order to tame the freedom-loving tribal people, the British adopted various policies ranging from persuasion to control and to armed intervention. It is estimated that between 1849 and 1939, there were 58 military campaigns sent to the Frontier Tribal Region [1]. The British authorities agreed to give autonomous status to the tribal region in return for their subjugation under the British rule. One such arrangement was the introduction of Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) in 1848 in six Pukhtuns populated area, which paved the way for full-fledged promulgation of the FCR in 1871, with minor modifications in 1876 [2]. Why did FCR come into force, let us look into the social system of FATA.

Social System of Fata: The people living in FATA are pre-dominantly Pashtuns. The social system of FATA is based on the Pashtuns code of conduct, which some characters based on long-standing Pashtun tribal tradition and these characters are: [3].

Nikat: Nikat denotes the share given by the government to each tribe depending on the area under its control. Most of the shares are the same as set by British nearly a century before.

Muajib: Muajib denotes subsidies and goodwill allowance payable to certain privileged people within a tribe. Muajib guarantees continuous allegiance of the tribe to the state.

Maliki/Lungi Allowance: Maliki allowance is hereditary i.e. transferable to next generation. The political agent grants this title with the consent of the governor, while the title of Lungi is of lower rank and is granted by the political agent and both Maliki and Lungi holders are responsible for maintaining peace and provide valuable information about the area under their control.

What is unique in the tribal social structure is that there are some un-codified set of rules, which guide the Pukhtuns way of life. These rules are called Pashtunwali and this Pashtunwali is one of the reasons that Al-Qaeda and Taliban have sway in the tribal region. The main obligations of Pashtunwali are [4]:

Nanawati: Nanawati literally means begging pardon for any wrong doing and ranging from murder to theft to verbal squabbling. One who took the initiative go along with family members and tribal elders to the victim house tendering apology. They also bring sheep or goats, his family women and the Qur'an, just to show his modesty. It is upon the victim to accept or reject the Nanawati.

Milmastia (Hospitality): It donates hospitality, but it open-handed hospitality, whether demanded by somebody or not. It is even extended to enemies, if he takes shelter with the rival. He is to be escorted to a safe place, the escort is called Badraga. This Badraga was formalized by the colonial rulers and was named as levies. According to James W. Spain "for gold, they will do almost anything, except betrayed a guest", adding "any person who can make his way into their dwellings will not only be safe, but will be kindly received [5].

Badal (Revenge): Taking revenge is like an obligation under Pashtunwali. Pashtuns have to average any wrong-doing to them irrespective of consequences.

Hujra: Hujra is a social centre for interaction between males in Pashtun region in general and in the tribal region in particular. Hujra is a place where people of the area come together to discuss problems marriage parties, funeral rituals are also held in Hujras. In most of the Hujras, there is a light music programme of Rubab and Mangay and local singers entertain the residents with folk songs. There happen to be Pashtuns' cultural dance i.e. Atan although occasionally. Tribal people do enjoy their lives through these programmes of entertainment. The reality is that they have not seen a far better and beautiful picture of the life, which exists just outside the boundaries of the agency. As they have very limited or even nil exposure, they have a very narrow worldview and are liable to be exploited, misguided and misused by the mullahs, who are not having better worldviews than laymen, yet they have greater legitimacy and creditability, hence more sway and power than their liberal counterpart. The situation in FATA today is because of this dismal socio-economic condition in FATA.

Socio-Economic Condition in Fata: According to the 1998 census report, FATA is the most economically backward areas of Pakistan. Around sixty percent of its population is below the national poverty line. Per-capita income is half of the national per-capita income. Per capita public development expenditure is one third of the national average. Some of the important indicators are: [6].

Communication and Transport Indicators: The FATA communication inventory comprises of roads, telephones and post offices. There is a total road of 4427.3 Km, of which 2499.70 is "high type" while 1927.60 Km is of "low type"; the number of telegraph offices is 6, while the number of telephone exchanges in the whole FATA is 46, according to 1998 census.

Educational Indicators: The overall literacy rate is 17.42 percent compared to the 56 percent nationally. Male literacy rate is 29 percent, while 3 percent female literacy rate compared of 32.6 percent for female nationally. For 3.1 million inhabitants, FATA has just 41 hospitals and a per doctor rate of one for 6762 compared to one doctor for 1359 nationally. Natural resources including minerals and coal are unexploited. Most local depend on subsistence agricultural since there is little industrial development and a few jobs.

Selected development indicators for Pakistan, NWFP and FATA

(1998, 2003)*			
Indicator	Pakistan	NWFP	FATA
Literacy ratio (both sexes, %)	43.92	35.41	17.42
Male literacy ratio (%)	54.81	51.39	29.51
Female literacy ratio (%)	32.02	18.82	3.00
Population per doctor	1,226	4,916	7,670
Population per bed in health institutions	1,341	1,594	2,179
Roads (per sq km)	0.26	0.13	0.17

Source: <http://www.fatagov.com>. Accessed on July 20, 2010

Legal and Constitutional Status of Fata: When FATA formally joined Pakistan, it was guaranteed to them that they would retain the same position, as they were having under Britain's rule. It was in this context that army was called back from the tribal area and a special ministry (Ministry of State and Frontier Region) was created and Jinnah took the charge of the ministry personally.

In 1956 status-quo was maintained in FATA. In 1962 constitution, FATA was kept outside the jurisdiction of central and provincial law due to their unique conditions and problems. Basic Democracy System was extended to FATA and one member from the electoral college of the basic democracy system was elected to central and provincial assemblies [7].

FATA constitutes territories of Pakistan under Article 1 of the 1973 constitution and there are seven Tribal Agencies, six Frontier Regions (FRs). Furthermore, Article 246 defines the tribal area and Article 247 defines the administrative system of FATA.

Article 247, clause (1) states: "Subject to the constitution, the executive authority of the federation shall extend to the Federally Administered Tribal Area and the executive authority of a province shall extend to the provincially administered tribal area therein".

Although the overall administrative and political control of FATA falls under the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) which is answerable to the elected prime minister, but it is almost irrelevant in policy implementation and execution and the actual executive authority rests with the president and is exercised through the provincial governor [8]. under Article 247 clause (2).

"The president may, from time to time, give such directions to the governor of the province relating to the whole or any part of the Tribal Area within the province as he may deem necessary and the governor shall in the exercise of his functions under this article, comply with such directions."

Local administration is run by the political agent in each agency. He is being assisted by Assistant Political Agent (APA), who heads a sub-division. The Political

Agent acts as an executive judge and revenue collector. He is responsible for developmental projects. He is all in all in an agency. Assistant Political Agent heads a sub-division, Tehsil is headed by a Political Tehsildar or Naib Tehsildar. Political Maharrar is the in-charge of sub-tehsil illaqa.

As far as the Political Administration of the Frontier Region (FR) is concerned each FR is under administrative control of the District Co-ordinator Officer (DCO) and day to day affairs are run by the APA or Tehsildar of the FR concerned.

Judicial Structure in Fata: FATA's judicial system is enshrined in the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) 1901, a hybrid colonial-era legal framework that mixes traditional customs and norms with executive discretion [9]. The British created this cruel law to tame the unruly tribal and to safeguard the Indian empire. Originally drafted in 1872, FCR was promulgated in 1901 and remained in force in the former NWFP (now Khyber-PakhtunKhaw) until 1963 and in Baluchistan until 1977. There are two kinds of tribal areas in Khyber-PakhtunKhaw. One is PATA (provincially administered tribal area) and the other FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas). The difference between the two is that PATA is under the legal jurisdiction of the provincial government and the court system of the state is working in PATA as in the rest of the country, but is absent from FATA. Political parties Act is also in force in PATA and not in FATA.

The FCR concentrates judicial, executive and police authority in the discretion of the PA. FATA is divided into three jurisdictions: [10].

Inaccessible Areas: These areas are under the nominal control of the government and the tribesmen are left to regulate their own disputes;

Administered Areas: The PA has jurisdiction over the administered areas, such as roads, government offices and other installations;

The Projected Areas: In these areas tribal jirgas deal with criminal and civil offences in accordance with the custom (rewaj) and PA can take executive action, if an offense is against a public official or against the interest of the state. What is more inhuman and cruel in the FCR is the provisions of collective responsibility and the collective territorial responsibility. Collective responsible denotes that if a crime is committed by an individual of a tribe, the whole tribe is subjected to colossal financial punishment. Women sell their jeweler to pay for punishment imposed.

Collective territorial responsibility denotes that if a crime is committed in the area of a tribe, the tribe would be responsible for that crime. The crime may be committed by one of the enemies of the tribe still they have to pay the price.

FCR Jirga: The custom of jirga (council of elders) was preserved in the FCR. The PA can refer a civil or criminal case to the Jirga. The Jirga ascertains guilt or innocence after hearing the parties to a dispute and passes verdict on the basis of rewaj [11]. However, the recommendations of the Jirga are not binding on the PA and PA has the ultimate authority to decide.

Due Process: There is no provision in the FCR to appeal against the decision of the PA either to the High Court or the Supreme Court of Pakistan. An appeal can be made to the FCR commissioner, appointed by the governor. A final appeal could be made to the FCR tribunal comprised of Provincial Law Secretary, Home Secretary and the Chief Secretary. The Chief Secretary has a decisive vote in case of tie. De to the skeleton nature of the FCR, it is very difficult to appeal and get one's right.

Electoral System: Adult franchise was introduced into FATA in 1996. But, adult franchise is no solution to the problem, if there is no choice among parties, as Political Parties Act has not been extended to FATA so far, then it is almost of no use to the people of FATA. The people have to vote for pro-government candidates in general and to Mullah Party especially. JUI (F) in particular. There is also a nominal local government system in FATA, but disproportionately manipulated by the Political Agents of the agencies. The provincial agency council has become lackey of the PA, as PA has executive authority over it, convenes its meetings and wields final authority in resolving procedural disputes [12].

The security system in FATA is in the hands of Khasadar, Scouts and Levies. They are to be assisted by the Frontier Corps (in agencies) and Frontier Constabulary (in FRs). After this brief introduction to FATA, let us now look at as that militancy is and what are the indigenous factors involved in the rise of militancy in the tribal area.

What is Militancy?: Concise Oxford Dictionary defines militancy as “phenomenon in which confrontational methods [use of arms] are used in support of a cause”.

It is an important definition. It can be applied to the militancy ranging on in the tribal region of Pakistan. They have taken up arms. They have “causes” rather than

a “cause” for which they are fighting. Before going in to the details; let us look into some of the similar characteristics of the militant movements. These characteristics are: [13].

- Militant religious movement tend to view existing government authority as corrupt and illegitimate because it is secular and not sufficiently rigorous in upholding religious authority or religiously sanctioned social and moral values.
- They attack the inability of government to address the domestic ills of the society in which the movement exists. In many cases, the religious movements substitute itself locally, especially in meting out justice and resolving of disputes.
- They subscribe to a particular set of behaviour and opinions that they believe political authority must reflect. Also, governmental authority must be in the hands of believers or subject to their close oversight.
- They are universalistic-they tend to see their views as part of inheritance of everyone, who is a believer. This gives them trans-state motivation... that international boundaries are not recognized as barriers to the propagation of the faith, even if this means resorting to violence.
- They are exclusionist. They put people of different/conflicting opinion to the margin, if not excluding them altogether. It is like translating of second class citizenship to minorities or any non-believer.
- They use coercion to achieve the only true end.

All these characteristics are important for militancy in FATA and they are almost fully fit into the characteristics of militants in the tribal region.

Now the indigenous factors responsible for the rise of militancy in the tribal regions are to be discussed. Two categories of indigenous factors would be used one, the primary factors; these are like cause of the rise of militancy in the tribal areas. Secondly, the risk factors i.e. those factors that fuel a phenomenon.

The Primary Factors or the Cause of Rise of Militancy in Fata

Use of Non-state Actors by the State to Achieve Foreign Policy Goals: There are no two words about the fact that the people of FATA are very religious minded and they could be exploited by the rhetoric of jihad. It was this affinity with religion that state tried to manipulate from time to time to achieve its foreign policy goals. The policy

of using non-state religious actors for the same purpose is not new and the policy has its roots in the very first years of Pakistan's inception.

Christine Faire of the Rand Corporation is of the view that Pakistan used proxy to rest the control of Kashmir from Maharaja Hari Singh in 1947 that led to the 1948 Kashmir War between Pakistan and India that ended on January 1, 1949 under the UN auspices and the demarcating of the ceasefire line between Pakistan and India [14].

Pakistan's interest in using proxy war may have been increased during the 1950's, when the United States provided insurgency-specific training during the cold war and Pakistan used these proxy elements to foment trouble in Kashmir again in August 1965 (in Operation Gibraltar) that caused the 1965 war between Pakistan and India.

In the early 1970s, Pakistan started aiding covertly the Islamists, who fled President Daoud suppression of the religious leader. Pakistan assisted them to gain two objectives. One was to transform the ethno-national demand of Afghanistan into a religiously motivated movement, where borders are not important i.e. Muslim Ummah. Secondly, to counter-act the increasing influence of USSR in Afghanistan, as USSR was closely aligned with India.

This use of proxy elements reached its heights in the early 1980s, when Pakistan became frontline state against the "Godless Commission" in Afghanistan, with the active support of U.S., Saudi Arabia and many more. According to one estimate 104 countries assisted Pakistan to oust USSR from Afghanistan.

In the 1990s, there were two fronts for using proxies by Pakistan. One was Afghanistan, where it tried to supplant a pro-Pakistan regime to get the highly controversial "strategic depth" while the second front was Kashmir, where a new lifeline was enthused by the Pakistan Intelligence Agencies to foment trouble in the India-held Kashmir the help of plethora of Mujahedeen militant organizations operating in Kashmir. These facts are open secret now.

However, 9/11 brought intense pressure on Pakistan to take a clear line, whether with US or against US and Pakistan opted for cooperating with the international community to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Many commentators and analysts are of the view that it was a temporary break. Pakistan never fully dissociated itself from its erstwhile allies.

Pakistan did pretty well in apprehending Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters at the earliest stages of the war on terror. Pakistan was hailed for all this by the

U.S. administration, even by president Bush. But soon reports started coming out that elements in the Pakistan Secret Agencies were covertly backing Taliban. Analysts were of the view that it might be because of couple of reasons. One possible reason might be that Pakistan was seriously distrusting America for what it did to be region, when USSR withdrew from Afghanistan in the late 1980s [15]. The other possible reason stated was that the Taliban could be used as "Plan B" when US and its allies leave Afghanistan [16]. Third possible reason was the growing influence of India in Afghanistan at the cost of Pakistan's interests and even some of the Pakistani officials were saying that India in Afghanistan was involved in creating law and order situation in Pakistan. Bush overture to India also impacted Pakistan's security establishment perception negatively.

According to Ahmad Rashid, Pervez Musharraf and his intelligence agencies has been taking US for a ride and they pretend to cooperate with the US in the war on terror and on the other hand, they were supporting and sheltering Taliban and other terrorist organizations [17].

The other example of Pakistan's support for Taliban was its continuing support for the Kashmiri Mujahideen and most of them shifted their bag and baggage to FATA to launch their operations in Afghanistan and to keep the Kashmiri struggle alive.

Pakistani Security Agencies' presence even in the "Quetta Shura" came to line light with the report published by London School of Economics in June 2010. It clearly indicated Pakistan's support for "Haqqani Group" and "Quetta Shura" as both operate in Afghanistan and avoid tussle with Pakistani state [18].

Tribal Autonomy and Special Status of Fata: its Contribution to Militancy: Under the tribal autonomy and special status of FATA, a space has been created that is filled by the Islamists, smugglers, drug cartels, etc.

The special status of FATA under FCR means no political party can extend itself to FATA with the sole exception of religious parties. Adult franchise was withheld until 1996. Nominal local government system was introduced, but is fully dominated by the Political Agent. No judicial system as in vogue in FATA, as the PA is a judge, jury and executioner. No fundamental rights to the people of FATA. No easy and effective appellate court system for appeal against the verdict of the PA.

In short, FATA is that part of the state that state owns but without any rights given the residents of FATA. State has kept FATA as "buffer". It is being used by the state, when strategic stakes are involved.

This tribal autonomy was [mis] used by the militants during the Afghan jihad. Militants went for operation in Afghanistan and came back for shelter, ammunition and fund.

After 9/11, as there was no security arrangement in FATA, the militants who crossed over from Afghanistan took refuge in FATA. They use FATA as a launching pad to avenge the atrocities committed by the U.S. and its allies and the state of Pakistan due to Pakistan's cooperation with the "infidels".

The Afghan jihad and the Taliban-era entrenched this culture of autonomy and created motivation in the tribal areas for jihad and brought new Wahabi influence to the region [19]. Like blowing up of CD shops, no shaving of beards and public execution of criminals. This tribal autonomy gave full sway over the region to the mullahs, who have the narrowest of worldviews among the residents. These mullahs played a role in motivating people other than their family members for jihad, even sometimes demanded the authoritative dispensation of justice, public morality and moral policing etc [20].

In short, in the name of customs and traditions of Pukhtuns, Islam and non-interference in the tribal autonomy, a space has been created among Pukhtuns' tribes in FATA, which eulogizing features of Pakhtunwali such as *ghairat* (honour), *milmastia* (hospitality), *badal* (revenge) and possession and display of firearms, jihad in the name of Islam and free trade in arms and narcotics [21]. Some of the good features like hospitality etc have been used to give way for jihad and militancy in the tribal area and illicit became licit in the name of Islam and autonomy of FATA.

Foreign Militants and Local Allies: Foreign Militants i.e. Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks etc. have been living in FATA since the Afghan jihad. Many of them married local women and became like tribals in eating, dressing and speaking (speaking Pashtu) fluently). Some of them involved in jihad and some in farming.

But post 9/11 entry of the militants into the tribal region was more radical, more brutal, more determined and more hardcore. They came to FATA, especially North and South Waziristan, Kurram and Bajaur and to the rest of the areas, in general. Their number varies, but the more agreed upon estimate is that they were 500-600 in number.

It is alleged that Al-Qaeda might have spent a large sum of money, especially in North and South Waziristan to gain local support in helping the resurgence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in their fight against Pakistan and the coalition forces in Afghanistan [22].

These foreign militants, now 5000 approximately are aided and abetted by the local militants and by around 7000 Punjabi militants.²³ Their presence in FATA, especially in North and South Waziristan, significantly contributed to the rise of militancy, as they were/are involved in targeted killings, especially of tribal elder and around 200 tribal elders were killed. The killing of these elders gave rise to a vacuum and this vacuum was filled by the local militants in the front seat and foreign militants as the back seat driver. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, also known as Pakistani Taliban, was formed in December 2007. Brian Fisher of the New America Foundation is of the view that TTP's target is Pakistan, while Quetta Shura and Haqqani Group are operating in Afghanistan and there might be some differences on the target, but he recognizes the fact that TTP is in cahoots with Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda has had close connection with the Taliban, now under Quetta Shura and Haqqani's command [24]. There might be some misunderstanding at lower level, but overall TTP, Quetta Shura, Haqqani Group, Punjabi Taliban are the one and the same thing.

Another factor in the rise of militancy in the tribal areas was the seeking of sanctuaries for the Kashmiri Mujahideen e.g. Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and sectarian organizations like, Sepah-e-Sihaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi etc., tried to seek sanctuaries in North and South Waziristan, [25] and they got sanctuaries because Hakeem Ullah Mehsud (Amir of TTP) and Qari Hussain Mehsude (suicide bombing expert) were members of SSP and LJ.

Weakening of the Administrative System: The prevailing system in FATA till the beginning of the military operations in Waziristan and the rest of the tribal region was not up to the mark, but the system succeeded in the smooth running of the show.

One of the main reasons for the weakening of the administrative system of the TATA was the launching of military operation, at the behest of U.S. [26] Traditionally, the PA regulates the affairs of the tribe by conducting Jirga and confiding the tribal Maliks, but the military start bypassing the PA and tried to control the tribes through the use of military force. Most of the analysts were of the view that military solution is not the only solution, but military went ahead with the programme. Military underwent heavy losses at the hands of the militants and military started to negotiate peace deals. Peace deals were made, but they emboldened the militants. They were almost the victorious. Now, they have their own taxation and administrative structure

[27]. i.e. punishing criminals, resolving disputes meting out justice, collecting taxes and there is none to ask, why are you doing this? It is now said that instead of rooting out militants, the military has enhanced the powers of the militants, advertently or inadvertently.

Collateral Damage: Pakistan army is well-trained in conventional war and its was having no experience of guerrilla warfare. When they launched military operations, they relied on artillery and air-power. The use artillery and air-power brought a lot of collateral damage on the innocent tribals, as majority of the tribals were not aligned to militants [28].

Hundreds of innocent men, women and children died in the fight between the army and militants, both local and foreigner. Many of them are psychic patients, as they were exposed to heart-wrenching brutalities.

It is natural that when person's close relatives die due to unnatural death, one asks who the murderer was. The case of tribal areas is very acute, where the concept of Badal (revenge) is very much entrenched. This zeal for revenge pushed many young tribal to the ring of militancy and they started fighting anyone, whether U.S. Pakistan or even fellow tribesmen.

Risk Factors Inthe Rise of Militancy in the Tribal Areas:

Risk Factor defined: Risk Factor is that factor that fuels a phenomenon rather than acting as a causative agent.

There are many factors that could be termed risk factors in the rise of militancy in the tribal areas. Some of the risk factors are: Madrassas, Education, Poverty, Economic Backwardness and Deprivation, Anti-Americanism and rise of sympathetic political party (MMA) etc.

The Risk Factors Are Discussed Briefly:

Madrassas: Madrassas or seminaries are institutions, where religious education is imparted, free-lodging is provided as gratis and where Islam as a religion is being thought to make a good human being out of an individual. There are two views about the link of militancy and the madrassas.

One view is that these seminaries, especially the Deobandi seminaries, were particularly prominent in the rise of religious extremism in the Pashtun-belt and with the backing of the state of Pakistan, the network of Pakistani and Afghan militants spawned in these seminaries and forged ties with the Arab fighters... [And the coup de grace] was Pakistan's backing for the Taliban regime in

Afghanistan that paved the way for the convergence. This network of militants and Afghanistan became safe haven for local, regional and global terrorists [29].

As tribal areas were used as staging ground for Afghan jihad, therefore, all the militant networks were closely-knit or at least knew each other. The increasing independence of the tribal areas was reflected in the account of madrassas providing both religious and military training... and a camp called 'Maaskar Sadda' was established in Kurram Agency, run by AbdalRabSayyaf and Sheikh JamiuRahman of Ethehad-i-Islam of Kunar established camp Huzaifa bin Yamaan in Bajaur that was reputed to have established 250 more madrassas throughout the tribal areas and to have controlled the Nawa pass between Mohmand and Afghan Kunar [30].

What is interesting to note is that there was a steady rise in the umber of madrassas during the Afghan jihad and onwards. The number of madrassas in Pakistan increased from round 700 in both East and West Pakistan of which 868 were in Punjab alone 1975 to 3874 in the whole country in 1995 [31]. Currently, there are over 17000 Islamic seminaries, out of which 13000 are registered and 4000 are unregistered [32].

The number is on the rise and according to one rough estimate, there are over 20000 Islamic seminaries operating in Pakistan. The five major federations or associations of madrassas in-charge of their organizational and infrastructural requirements belong to Deobandi, Barelvi, Salafi, Shia and Jammata-i-Islami (JI). [33] All these sects have their own militant organizations that operate both in Indian-held Kashmir and Afghanistan.

So far as the curriculum is concerned, the students are socialized in the message of hostility towards others, especially Hindus and Jews, the westernized ruling elite in Pakistan and the West [34]. The inculcation of Jihad culture is not less prevalent in the madrassas' course and environment setting that glorifies jihad abnormally. The mullahs play important role in this regard, who declare jihad as duty for the sons of other parents, but not for their own sons and relatives.

The other view is that all Islamic seminaries are not directly involved in the religious militancy that has swept across Pakistan. This view is being put forwarded by Rebecca Winthrop and Corinne Graff of the Brookings Institution. They are of the view that much attention has been given to the role of madrassas in fueling militancy..., but at the heart of debate is that it is the failure of the

government of Pakistan that has led to provide adequate education [35]. They enumerate three reasons in support of their arguments: [36].

No Steep Rise in enrollment in Madrassas: The share of madrassas as compared to schools is much lower than previously through the number of madrassas is even controversial. International crisis group said in 2002 that a third of full-time Pakistani students were enrolled in madrassas. WorldBank contradicted the findings of ICG in 2005 by saying that around one percent of students' enrolment is in madrassas, i.e. 4, 75,000 students in madrassas.

Currently the students' enrolment varies but it is well below 10 percent of the full-time school going population. According to 2007-08 estimates of Ministry of Education, there are 1.6 million students enrolled in madrassas.

Demand for Legitimate Religious Schooling: Parents want to enroll their children out of preference not necessity. They think that religious education is a must for instilling good morals and proper ethics. Most of the parents interviewed were satisfied with religious education for their children, even if, madrassas' graduates suffer from unemployment.

A Few Bad Apples: It is clear that a few of the madrassas, not all of them, are involved in militancy, especially with the Taliban and sectarian militants. Recent evidence shows that the connection between militancy and madrassas is mixed. On the one hand, madrassas in the tribal areas and Khyber-PakhtunKhawa, which are involved in the Taliban-led insurgency, so is the case of involvement of madrassas in Punjab, in general and in South Punjab, in particular, also they are involved in sectarian killings as well. Recent research shows that militants involved in Kashmir were not madrassas' graduates, or very a few of them. Also, militants of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba are university graduates rather than madrassas' graduates. Moreover, the research conducted by Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey shows that the recruits involved in the five major international terrorist attacks had no connection with madrassas. It is clear from the discussion that the share of madrassas to the militancy is much lower than previously thought.

Education as a Risk Factor: There are many reasons that could be put forward for the support of the argument. One reason is the prevalent culture in the tribal areas, where people are subjected to religious worldview only. They are living with siege mentality. They have not seen

the pleasant side of life, where people do not want to die, while the tribesmen live in an environment, where death (martyrdom) is glorified and almost every young man wants to die.

Second reason is that many schools, public sector were demolished by the militants with students either injured or killed. There are very few such incidents of demolishing madrassas in Pakistan. Therefore, people send their children to madrassas for security reasons.

Thirdly, even in the public schools, the students are taught narrow worldview, no critical citizenship skill. The poor education system foster grievances that leads to frustration and the graduates opts for militant organizations.

Poverty: Poverty fuels militancy and is one of the important factors that factors that fuels militancy in the tribal area. FATA is one of the most backward regions; with 60% population live below the poverty line [37]. Per capita public expenditure is one third of the average of Pakistan. Employment opportunities are limited and the main sector of employment is agriculture and transport (illegal), cross-border trade, small businesses, arms and drugs trafficking [38].

However, the important thing to note is that all these things were prevailing very much there before 9/11, but there was no militancy of the kind. Khalid Aziz says that socio-economic factor for the rise of militancy in FATA is partial explanation and there is something else that pushed tribal youth towards messianism and nihilism [39].

Anti-Americanism: Most of the people in the tribal region think that U.S. is at war with Islam. They first occupied Afghanistan and then Iraq. They are also tending to think that U.S. is prodding Israel to commit atrocities against the Palestinians and they are not resolving the Israeli Palestinian conflict. So is the case with the issue of Kashmir. They blame U.S for all the wrong-doings in the world; and it is always easy to blame others for one's shortcomings.

The question is, if anti-Americanism is fueling the militancy, then, why the war against one's compatriots; why civilians and military personnel are being killed? Why Jirgas were put to suicide bombing. It means that anti-Americanism might be a risk factor that fuels the militancy, but is not the primary cause.

The Rise of MMA: The rise of MutahidaMajlas-e-Amal (MMA) acted as a risk factor to the rise of militancy in the tribal areas. MMA election slogan was "go America go". They openly blamed CIA, Black Water for the suicide

bombing during the regime. They were having soft corner for the Taliban, even they supported the local Taliban. They hampered all the effort to launch military operations in Swat by the army. MMA's secretary-general Maulana Fazlur Rehman took strong position on defending FATA's autonomy and sanctity, opposing American's interests and condemning military action aiming at killing or extraditing foreign elements from the region [40].

Agency Profile of Each Agency of Fata:

South Waziristan Agency: Due to geographical contiguity of South Waziristan Agency (SWA) with Afghanistan, most of the foreign militants entered South Waziristan Agency from Tora Bora in 2001.

The two most important tribal groups in South Waziristan are the Mehsuds, who live in mountains and Ahmadzai Wazir, who live near the administrative headquarter of WANA. They were often at logger-heads over petty issues. Bhattannis formed third tribal group in South Waziristan Agency (SWA).

SWA was the first tribal agency, where military operation was launched against foreign militants. Maulana Nek Muhammad Wazir was the first militant commander, who led rebellion against the army, but later underwent in the *Treaty of Shakai* (2004) with the government, but the agreement did not last long. He was killed by a hell-fire missile from a U.S. drone attack [41].

The fighting, then, shifted to the Mehsud's areas in South Waziristan, as the Taliban leadership was taken over by Baitullah Mehsud.

In the begging of militancy Wazir and Mehsud militants were part of the umbrella organization, also known as TTP, but latter got separated and the separation may be a mere eyewash, as can be seen in retrospect. Both the Wazir commanders- Mullah Nazir (SWA) and Hafiz GulBahadur (North Waziristan) made their own group Shura-i-Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen (SIM), while Mehsud Taliban led by Baitullah Mehsud, his Deputy Hakeem Ullah Mehsud, Wali-ur-Rehman and Qari Hussain were in the same loop- TTP.

Both the groups supported attacks against NATO & Afghan troops in Afghanistan. Wazir militants are avoiding clashes with the security forces in Pakistan and they ousted Uzbek militants from their areas. TTP closely linked with Al-Qaeda, sees Pakistan as collaborator of U.S. and therefore, attacks inside Pakistan are justifiable.

The row over the leadership of TTP was resolved by Siraj-ud-Din Haqqani S/o Jalal-ud-Din Haqqani and Hakeem Ullah was made Amir over Maulvi Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur and Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud [42].

North Waziristan Agency: There are two major tribes in North Waziristan Agency (NWA): Wazir of Utmanzai sub-tribe and Dawar. North Waziristan is relatively safe safe-haven for all the militants including foreigners i.e. both Al-Qaeda and Haqqani Group (Khost, Afghanistan). The most important militant commander in North Waziristan, are Hafez GulBahadur and Siraj-ud-Din Haqqani. Maulana Sadiq Noor is deputy of Hafiz GulBahadur. Both the commanders support attacks inside Afghanistan and avoid confrontations with the Pakistan army, as they would lose the safe haven, if Pakistan army was regularly attacked. Other groups like Asia Tigers are also operating in the North Waziristan. The group claimed the abduction of Halid Khawaja, Col. Iman and Asad Qureshi. Khalid Khawaja was later killed.

Khurram Agency: The division in Kurram Agency is along sectarian lines rather than tribal lines. There are Shias and Sunni sectarian groups in the Kurram Agency. The population of Shias is 40 percent.

The militancy in the Kurram has sectarian dimension. The Shia group was not happy with the Taliban regime in Kabul, as the Shias are very much influenced by the Iranians. When the Taliban regime was no more in Kabul, they were happy.

But they were surely unhappy with the cross-border militancy in Afghanistan. They stood against the Taliban's way to cross over to Afghanistan. This was the fault line between the Taliban and the Shias. Taliban were supported by Sepah-e-Sihaba Pakistan, with whom Hakeem Ullah Mehsud and Qari Hussain has had links before.

The international dimension of the conflict was/is the support of Saudi Arabia for the Sunnis and that of Iran for the Shias. Thousands of the people died in the sectarian clashes.

Aurakzai Agency: Aurakzai Agency is the only agency that does not share border with Afghanistan, however, it became an important base for the Taliban operation. Aurakzai Agency also witnessed sectarian clashes. There are economic grievances of the majority Sunnis against the minority Shias. The history of sectarian violence goes back to 1927, when protest over a local shrine went violent [43].

The first Taliban group was formed in the late 1990s by Mullah Muhammad Rahim in Aurakzai Agency. The group named Tehrik-e-Tulaba Movement (TTM) was heavily influenced by the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi in the Malakand division [44].

The TTP of 2007 was extended to Aurakzai Agency with Hakeem Ullah Mehsud (known anti-Shias) as a head of Aurakzai, Kurram and Khyber Agencies.

In 2008, TTP officially imposed Shariah, banning music, television and women from visiting bazaars. Sikhs were made to pay jizya (tax on non-Muslims) i.e. jizya was imposed on Sikh families that lived in the agency for centuries [45].

Khyber Agency: Khyber Agency is named after the famous mountain pass that connects Pakistan and Afghanistan. Khyber borders Peshawar, that is why, it is comparatively well-developed and modern. Khyber Agency is plagued by multiple jihadi outfits.

The Talibanization of Khyber Agency is relatively recent and differs from the evolution of these movements in other agencies and currently, there are three groups operating in Khyber Agency [46]. The Lashkar-e-Islam founded by Mufti Munir Shakir and currently led by Mangal Bagh; the Ansar-ul-Islam founder by Pir Saif-ur-Rehman and currently led by Mehbood-ul-Haq; and Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anal Munkir (promotion of virtue and prevention of vice (PVPV) founded by Haji Naamdar, who was assassinated in 2008.

Out of these militant organizations, Lashkar-e-Islam and Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anal Munkir are militant Deobandi Organization, while Ansur-ul-Islam is of Bareilvi School of Thought that is relatively liberal and tolerant.

The important factor that needs to be noted is that these organizations are fighting each other, but do not carry out attacks inside Afghanistan, but they do attack at NATO's convoys who are on their way to Afghanistan through Khyber Pass.

TTP has a presence in Khyber, but is overshadowed by the presence of Lashkar-e-Islam, Ansar-ul-Islam and Amr Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anal Munkir. FM channels played a role in the rise of sectarian militancy in the Khyber Agency. Criminal gangs also joined either of the group to make their presence felt and they are involved in the car-lifting and high-profile abduction like that of Afghan ambassador-designate Abdul Khaliq Farakhi and Iranian Consul-General.

Mohmand Agency: Mohmand Agency is considered to be an agency that is having more stakes in the state of Pakistan, yet it could not avoid the sweep of Talibanization and militancy. TTP went to Mohmand Agency and commander Khalid was designated as its commander of Mohmand region. Commander Omar Khalid

came to prominence, when he captured the shrine of Haji Sahib Turangzai in 2007 and renamed it as a "Lal Masjid" as a show of solidarity with the Lal Masjid clerics of Islamabad. Commander Khalid has sway over Khoizai, Baizai and Lakaro areas of Mohmand Agency.

The history of militancy could be traced to the hosting of Afghan refugees in 1980s and was recruiting ground for the TNSM. In 1985, Jamil-ur-Rahman of the Safi tribe split for Gulbaddin Hikmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami and founded Jamat-al-Dawa, a Salafi party that attracted both Arab fighters and slew of money, from private Saudi and Kuwaiti sources [47].

Jamat-al-Dawa became very strong in Afghanistan Kunar province, adopting several brutal doctrines. Jamil-ur-Rahman became brutal and was assassinated in 1991 by his Egyptian gunman. Commander Omar Khalid took inspiration from him. Omar Khalid is now reportedly dead.

Bajaur Agency: Bajaur Agency is one of the epicenters of the militancy largely due to its contiguity with Afghanistan Kunar province. Many foreign fighters took refuge in 2001, after retreating from Afghanistan. The roots of militancy in Bajaur are found in the TNSM in the nearby Malakand division of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. TNSM did not show its mettle, but in 2001 Lashkar of 10000 people from the region was marked success, but ended in a disaster. The arrest of Sufi Muhammad was manipulated by Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, who became the leader of TTP of Mohmand branch and openly voiced support for Bait Ullah Mehsud, Mullah Omar and Osama Bin Laden.

Al-Qaeda members, Abu Faraj Al-Libbi lived in Bajaur and Aiman-uz-Zawahiri alleged wifed one of the women in Bajaur. These linkages brought Al-Qaeda and foreign fighters to the Bajaur Agency. Maulvi Faqir Muhammad softened his stance towards Pakistan, but the region is not fully tamed yet.

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